Remove unneeded intermediate folders

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Billy Tat
2022-08-17 10:23:03 -07:00
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---
title: Kubernetes Security Best Practices
weight: 5
---
### Restricting cloud metadata API access
Cloud providers such as AWS, Azure, DigitalOcean or GCP often expose metadata services locally to instances. By default, this endpoint is accessible by pods running on a cloud instance, including pods in hosted Kubernetes providers such as EKS, AKS, DigitalOcean Kubernetes or GKE, and can contain cloud credentials for that node, provisioning data such as kubelet credentials, or other sensitive data. To mitigate this risk when running on a cloud platform, follow the [Kubernetes security recommendations](https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/securing-a-cluster/#restricting-cloud-metadata-api-access): limit permissions given to instance credentials, use network policies to restrict pod access to the metadata API, and avoid using provisioning data to deliver secrets.
It is advised to consult your cloud provider's security best practices for further recommendations and specific details on how to restrict access to cloud instance metadata API.
Further references: MITRE ATT&CK knowledge base on - [Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/005/).
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---
title: Security Advisories and CVEs
weight: 300
---
Rancher is committed to informing the community of security issues in our products. Rancher will publish security advisories and CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) for issues we have resolved. New security advisories are also published in Rancher's GitHub [security page](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/advisories).
| ID | Description | Date | Resolution |
|----|-------------|------|------------|
| [CVE-2022-21951](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/advisories/GHSA-vrph-m5jj-c46c) | This vulnerability only affects customers using [Weave](https://rancher.com/docs/rancher/v2.6/en/faq/networking/cni-providers/#weave) Container Network Interface (CNI) when configured through [RKE templates](https://rancher.com/docs/rancher/v2.6/en/admin-settings/rke-templates/). A vulnerability was discovered in Rancher versions 2.5.0 up to and including 2.5.13, and 2.6.0 up to and including 2.6.4, where a user interface (UI) issue with RKE templates does not include a value for the Weave password when Weave is chosen as the CNI. If a cluster is created based on the mentioned template, and Weave is configured as the CNI, no password will be created for [network encryption](https://www.weave.works/docs/net/latest/tasks/manage/security-untrusted-networks/) in Weave; therefore, network traffic in the cluster will be sent unencrypted. | 24 May 2022 | [Rancher v2.6.5](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.6.5) and [Rancher v2.5.14](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.5.14) |
| [CVE-2021-36784](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/advisories/GHSA-jwvr-vv7p-gpwq) | A vulnerability was discovered in Rancher versions from 2.5.0 up to and including 2.5.12 and from 2.6.0 up to and including 2.6.3 which allows users who have create or update permissions on [Global Roles](https://rancher.com/docs/rancher/v2.6/en/admin-settings/rbac/) to escalate their permissions, or those of another user, to admin-level permissions. Global Roles grant users Rancher-wide permissions, such as the ability to create clusters. In the identified versions of Rancher, when users are given permission to edit or create Global Roles, they are not restricted to only granting permissions which they already posses. This vulnerability affects customers who utilize non-admin users that are able to create or edit Global Roles. The most common use case for this scenario is the `restricted-admin` role. | 14 Apr 2022 | [Rancher v2.6.4](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.6.4) and [Rancher v2.5.13](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.5.13) |
| [CVE-2021-4200](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/advisories/GHSA-hx8w-ghh8-r4xf) | This vulnerability only affects customers using the `restricted-admin` role in Rancher. A vulnerability was discovered in Rancher versions from 2.5.0 up to and including 2.5.12 and from 2.6.0 up to and including 2.6.3 where the `global-data` role in `cattle-global-data` namespace grants write access to the Catalogs. Since each user with any level of catalog access was bound to the `global-data` role, this grants write access to templates (`CatalogTemplates`) and template versions (`CatalogTemplateVersions`) for any user with any level of catalog access. New users created in Rancher are by default assigned to the `user` role (standard user), which is not designed to grant write catalog access. This vulnerability effectively elevates the privilege of any user to write access for the catalog template and catalog template version resources. | 14 Apr 2022 | [Rancher v2.6.4](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.6.4) and [Rancher v2.5.13](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.5.13) |
| [GHSA-wm2r-rp98-8pmh](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/advisories/GHSA-wm2r-rp98-8pmh) | This vulnerability only affects customers using [Fleet](https://rancher.com/docs/rancher/v2.6/en/deploy-across-clusters/fleet/) for continuous delivery with authenticated Git and/or Helm repositories. An issue was discovered in `go-getter` library in versions prior to [`v1.5.11`](https://github.com/hashicorp/go-getter/releases/tag/v1.5.11) that exposes SSH private keys in base64 format due to a failure in redacting such information from error messages. The vulnerable version of this library is used in Rancher through Fleet in versions of Fleet prior to [`v0.3.9`](https://github.com/rancher/fleet/releases/tag/v0.3.9). This issue affects Rancher versions 2.5.0 up to and including 2.5.12 and from 2.6.0 up to and including 2.6.3. The issue was found and reported by Dagan Henderson from Raft Engineering. | 14 Apr 2022 | [Rancher v2.6.4](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.6.4) and [Rancher v2.5.13](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.5.13) |
| [CVE-2021-36778](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/advisories/GHSA-4fc7-hc63-7fjg) | A vulnerability was discovered in Rancher versions from 2.5.0 up to and including 2.5.11 and from 2.6.0 up to and including 2.6.2, where an insufficient check of the same-origin policy when downloading Helm charts from a configured private repository can lead to exposure of the repository credentials to a third-party provider. This issue only happens when the user configures access credentials to a private repository in Rancher inside `Apps & Marketplace > Repositories`. The issue was found and reported by Martin Andreas Ullrich. | 14 Apr 2022 | [Rancher v2.6.3](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.6.3) and [Rancher v2.5.12](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.5.12) |
| [GHSA-hwm2-4ph6-w6m5](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/advisories/GHSA-hwm2-4ph6-w6m5) | A vulnerability was discovered in versions of Rancher starting 2.0 up to and including 2.6.3. The `restricted` pod security policy (PSP) provided in Rancher deviated from the upstream `restricted` policy provided in Kubernetes on account of which Rancher's PSP had `runAsUser` set to `runAsAny`, while upstream had `runAsUser` set to `MustRunAsNonRoot`. This allowed containers to run as any user, including a privileged user (`root`), even when Rancher's `restricted` policy was enforced on a project or at the cluster level. | 31 Mar 2022 | [Rancher v2.6.4](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.6.4) |
| [CVE-2021-36775](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/advisories/GHSA-28g7-896h-695v) | A vulnerability was discovered in Rancher versions up to and including 2.4.17, 2.5.11 and 2.6.2. After removing a `Project Role` associated with a group from the project, the bindings that granted access to cluster-scoped resources for those subjects were not deleted. This was due to an incomplete authorization logic check. A user who was a member of the affected group with authenticated access to Rancher could exploit this vulnerability to access resources they shouldn't have had access to. The exposure level would depend on the original permission level granted to the affected project role. This vulnerability only affected customers using group based authentication in Rancher. | 31 Mar 2022 | [Rancher v2.6.3](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.6.3), [Rancher v2.5.12](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.5.12) and [Rancher v2.4.18](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.4.18) |
| [CVE-2021-36776](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/advisories/GHSA-gvh9-xgrq-r8hw) | A vulnerability was discovered in Rancher versions starting 2.5.0 up to and including 2.5.9, that allowed an authenticated user to impersonate any user on a cluster through an API proxy, without requiring knowledge of the impersonated user's credentials. This was due to the API proxy not dropping the impersonation header before sending the request to the Kubernetes API. A malicious user with authenticated access to Rancher could use this to impersonate another user with administrator access in Rancher, thereby gaining administrator level access to the cluster. | 31 Mar 2022 | [Rancher v2.6.0](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.6.0) and [Rancher v2.5.10](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.5.10) |
| [CVE-2021-25318](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-25318) | A vulnerability was discovered in Rancher versions 2.0 through the aforementioned fixed versions, where users were granted access to resources regardless of the resource's API group. For example, Rancher should have allowed users access to `apps.catalog.cattle.io`, but instead incorrectly gave access to `apps.*`. Resources affected in the **Downstream clusters** and **Rancher management cluster** can be found [here](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/advisories/GHSA-f9xf-jq4j-vqw4). There is not a direct mitigation besides upgrading to the patched Rancher versions. | 14 Jul 2021 | [Rancher v2.5.9](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.5.9) and [Rancher v2.4.16](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.4.16) |
| [CVE-2021-31999](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-31999) | A vulnerability was discovered in Rancher 2.0.0 through the aforementioned patched versions, where a malicious Rancher user could craft an API request directed at the proxy for the Kubernetes API of a managed cluster to gain access to information they do not have access to. This is done by passing the "Impersonate-User" or "Impersonate-Group" header in the Connection header, which is then correctly removed by the proxy. At this point, instead of impersonating the user and their permissions, the request will act as if it was from the Rancher management server and incorrectly return the information. The vulnerability is limited to valid Rancher users with some level of permissions on the cluster. There is not a direct mitigation besides upgrading to the patched Rancher versions. | 14 Jul 2021 | [Rancher v2.5.9](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.5.9) and [Rancher v2.4.16](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.4.16) |
| [CVE-2021-25320](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-25320) | A vulnerability was discovered in Rancher 2.2.0 through the aforementioned patched versions, where cloud credentials weren't being properly validated through the Rancher API. Specifically through a proxy designed to communicate with cloud providers. Any Rancher user that was logged-in and aware of a cloud-credential ID that was valid for a given cloud provider, could call that cloud provider's API through the proxy API, and the cloud-credential would be attached. The exploit is limited to valid Rancher users. There is not a direct mitigation outside of upgrading to the patched Rancher versions. | 14 Jul 2021 | [Rancher v2.5.9](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.5.9) and [Rancher v2.4.16](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.4.16) |
| [CVE-2021-25313](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-25313) | A security vulnerability was discovered on all Rancher 2 versions. When accessing the Rancher API with a browser, the URL was not properly escaped, making it vulnerable to an XSS attack. Specially crafted URLs to these API endpoints could include JavaScript which would be embedded in the page and execute in a browser. There is no direct mitigation. Avoid clicking on untrusted links to your Rancher server. | 2 Mar 2021 | [Rancher v2.5.6](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.5.6), [Rancher v2.4.14](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.4.14), and [Rancher v2.3.11](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.3.11) |
| [CVE-2019-14435](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-14435) | This vulnerability allows authenticated users to potentially extract otherwise private data out of IPs reachable from system service containers used by Rancher. This can include but not only limited to services such as cloud provider metadata services. Although Rancher allow users to configure whitelisted domains for system service access, this flaw can still be exploited by a carefully crafted HTTP request. The issue was found and reported by Matt Belisle and Alex Stevenson at Workiva. | 5 Aug 2019 | [Rancher v2.2.7](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.2.7) and [Rancher v2.1.12](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.1.12) |
| [CVE-2019-14436](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-14436) | The vulnerability allows a member of a project that has access to edit role bindings to be able to assign themselves or others a cluster level role granting them administrator access to that cluster. The issue was found and reported by Michal Lipinski at Nokia. | 5 Aug 2019 | [Rancher v2.2.7](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.2.7) and [Rancher v2.1.12](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.1.12) |
| [CVE-2019-13209](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-13209) | The vulnerability is known as a [Cross-Site Websocket Hijacking attack](https://www.christian-schneider.net/CrossSiteWebSocketHijacking.html). This attack allows an exploiter to gain access to clusters managed by Rancher with the roles/permissions of a victim. It requires that a victim to be logged into a Rancher server and then access a third-party site hosted by the exploiter. Once that is accomplished, the exploiter is able to execute commands against the Kubernetes API with the permissions and identity of the victim. Reported by Matt Belisle and Alex Stevenson from Workiva. | 15 Jul 2019 | [Rancher v2.2.5](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.2.5), [Rancher v2.1.11](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.1.11) and [Rancher v2.0.16](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.0.16) |
| [CVE-2019-12303](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-12303) | Project owners can inject extra fluentd logging configurations that makes it possible to read files or execute arbitrary commands inside the fluentd container. Reported by Tyler Welton from Untamed Theory. | 5 Jun 2019 | [Rancher v2.2.4](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.2.4), [Rancher v2.1.10](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.1.10) and [Rancher v2.0.15](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.0.15) |
| [CVE-2019-12274](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-12274) | Nodes using the built-in node drivers using a file path option allows the machine to read arbitrary files including sensitive ones from inside the Rancher server container. | 5 Jun 2019 | [Rancher v2.2.4](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.2.4), [Rancher v2.1.10](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.1.10) and [Rancher v2.0.15](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.0.15) |
| [CVE-2019-11202](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-11202) | The default admin, that is shipped with Rancher, will be re-created upon restart of Rancher despite being explicitly deleted. | 16 Apr 2019 | [Rancher v2.2.2](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.2.2), [Rancher v2.1.9](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.1.9) and [Rancher v2.0.14](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.0.14) |
| [CVE-2019-6287](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-6287) | Project members continue to get access to namespaces from projects that they were removed from if they were added to more than one project. | 29 Jan 2019 | [Rancher v2.1.6](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.1.6) and [Rancher v2.0.11](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.0.11) |
| [CVE-2018-20321](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-20321) | Any project member with access to the `default` namespace can mount the `netes-default` service account in a pod and then use that pod to execute administrative privileged commands against the Kubernetes cluster. | 29 Jan 2019 | [Rancher v2.1.6](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.1.6) and [Rancher v2.0.11](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.0.11) - Rolling back from these versions or greater have specific [instructions]({{<baseurl>}}/rancher/v2.6/en/installation/install-rancher-on-k8s/rollbacks). |
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---
title: Hardening Guide with CIS 1.5 Benchmark
weight: 200
aliases:
- /rancher/v2.x/en/security/rancher-2.5/1.5-hardening-2.5/
---
This document provides prescriptive guidance for hardening a production installation of a RKE cluster to be used with Rancher v2.5. It outlines the configurations and controls required to address Kubernetes benchmark controls from the Center for Information Security (CIS).
> This hardening guide describes how to secure the nodes in your cluster, and it is recommended to follow this guide before installing Kubernetes.
This hardening guide is intended to be used for RKE clusters and associated with specific versions of the CIS Kubernetes Benchmark, Kubernetes, and Rancher:
Rancher Version | CIS Benchmark Version | Kubernetes Version
----------------|-----------------------|------------------
Rancher v2.5 | Benchmark v1.5 | Kubernetes 1.15
[Click here to download a PDF version of this document](https://releases.rancher.com/documents/security/2.5/Rancher_Hardening_Guide_CIS_1.5.pdf)
### Overview
This document provides prescriptive guidance for hardening a RKE cluster to be used for installing Rancher v2.5 with Kubernetes v1.15 or provisioning a RKE cluster with Kubernetes 1.15 to be used within Rancher v2.5. It outlines the configurations required to address Kubernetes benchmark controls from the Center for Information Security (CIS).
For more detail about evaluating a hardened cluster against the official CIS benchmark, refer to the [CIS 1.5 Benchmark - Self-Assessment Guide - Rancher v2.5]({{< baseurl >}}/rancher/v2.5/en/security/rancher-2.5/1.5-benchmark-2.5/).
#### Known Issues
- Rancher **exec shell** and **view logs** for pods are **not** functional in a CIS 1.5 hardened setup when only public IP is provided when registering custom nodes. This functionality requires a private IP to be provided when registering the custom nodes.
- When setting the `default_pod_security_policy_template_id:` to `restricted` Rancher creates **RoleBindings** and **ClusterRoleBindings** on the default service accounts. The CIS 1.5 5.1.5 check requires the default service accounts have no roles or cluster roles bound to it apart from the defaults. In addition the default service accounts should be configured such that it does not provide a service account token and does not have any explicit rights assignments.
### Configure Kernel Runtime Parameters
The following `sysctl` configuration is recommended for all nodes type in the cluster. Set the following parameters in `/etc/sysctl.d/90-kubelet.conf`:
```
vm.overcommit_memory=1
vm.panic_on_oom=0
kernel.panic=10
kernel.panic_on_oops=1
kernel.keys.root_maxbytes=25000000
```
Run `sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/90-kubelet.conf` to enable the settings.
### Configure `etcd` user and group
A user account and group for the **etcd** service is required to be setup before installing RKE. The **uid** and **gid** for the **etcd** user will be used in the RKE **config.yml** to set the proper permissions for files and directories during installation time.
#### create `etcd` user and group
To create the **etcd** group run the following console commands.
The commands below use `52034` for **uid** and **gid** are for example purposes. Any valid unused **uid** or **gid** could also be used in lieu of `52034`.
```
groupadd --gid 52034 etcd
useradd --comment "etcd service account" --uid 52034 --gid 52034 etcd
```
Update the RKE **config.yml** with the **uid** and **gid** of the **etcd** user:
``` yaml
services:
etcd:
gid: 52034
uid: 52034
```
#### Set `automountServiceAccountToken` to `false` for `default` service accounts
Kubernetes provides a default service account which is used by cluster workloads where no specific service account is assigned to the pod. Where access to the Kubernetes API from a pod is required, a specific service account should be created for that pod, and rights granted to that service account. The default service account should be configured such that it does not provide a service account token and does not have any explicit rights assignments.
For each namespace including **default** and **kube-system** on a standard RKE install the **default** service account must include this value:
```
automountServiceAccountToken: false
```
Save the following yaml to a file called `account_update.yaml`
``` yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
name: default
automountServiceAccountToken: false
```
Create a bash script file called `account_update.sh`. Be sure to `chmod +x account_update.sh` so the script has execute permissions.
```
#!/bin/bash -e
for namespace in $(kubectl get namespaces -A -o json | jq -r '.items[].metadata.name'); do
kubectl patch serviceaccount default -n ${namespace} -p "$(cat account_update.yaml)"
done
```
### Ensure that all Namespaces have Network Policies defined
Running different applications on the same Kubernetes cluster creates a risk of one
compromised application attacking a neighboring application. Network segmentation is
important to ensure that containers can communicate only with those they are supposed
to. A network policy is a specification of how selections of pods are allowed to
communicate with each other and other network endpoints.
Network Policies are namespace scoped. When a network policy is introduced to a given
namespace, all traffic not allowed by the policy is denied. However, if there are no network
policies in a namespace all traffic will be allowed into and out of the pods in that
namespace. To enforce network policies, a CNI (container network interface) plugin must be enabled.
This guide uses [canal](https://github.com/projectcalico/canal) to provide the policy enforcement.
Additional information about CNI providers can be found
[here](https://rancher.com/blog/2019/2019-03-21-comparing-kubernetes-cni-providers-flannel-calico-canal-and-weave/)
Once a CNI provider is enabled on a cluster a default network policy can be applied. For reference purposes a
**permissive** example is provide below. If you want to allow all traffic to all pods in a namespace
(even if policies are added that cause some pods to be treated as “isolated”),
you can create a policy that explicitly allows all traffic in that namespace. Save the following `yaml` as
`default-allow-all.yaml`. Additional [documentation](https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/network-policies/)
about network policies can be found on the Kubernetes site.
> This `NetworkPolicy` is not recommended for production use
``` yaml
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: default-allow-all
spec:
podSelector: {}
ingress:
- {}
egress:
- {}
policyTypes:
- Ingress
- Egress
```
Create a bash script file called `apply_networkPolicy_to_all_ns.sh`. Be sure to
`chmod +x apply_networkPolicy_to_all_ns.sh` so the script has execute permissions.
```
#!/bin/bash -e
for namespace in $(kubectl get namespaces -A -o json | jq -r '.items[].metadata.name'); do
kubectl apply -f default-allow-all.yaml -n ${namespace}
done
```
Execute this script to apply the `default-allow-all.yaml` the **permissive** `NetworkPolicy` to all namespaces.
### Reference Hardened RKE `cluster.yml` configuration
The reference `cluster.yml` is used by the RKE CLI that provides the configuration needed to achieve a hardened install
of Rancher Kubernetes Engine (RKE). Install [documentation](https://rancher.com/docs/rke/latest/en/installation/) is
provided with additional details about the configuration items. This reference `cluster.yml` does not include the required **nodes** directive which will vary depending on your environment. Documentation for node configuration can be found here: https://rancher.com/docs/rke/latest/en/config-options/nodes
``` yaml
# If you intend to deploy Kubernetes in an air-gapped environment,
# please consult the documentation on how to configure custom RKE images.
kubernetes_version: "v1.15.9-rancher1-1"
enable_network_policy: true
default_pod_security_policy_template_id: "restricted"
# the nodes directive is required and will vary depending on your environment
# documentation for node configuration can be found here:
# https://rancher.com/docs/rke/latest/en/config-options/nodes
nodes:
services:
etcd:
uid: 52034
gid: 52034
kube-api:
pod_security_policy: true
secrets_encryption_config:
enabled: true
audit_log:
enabled: true
admission_configuration:
event_rate_limit:
enabled: true
kube-controller:
extra_args:
feature-gates: "RotateKubeletServerCertificate=true"
scheduler:
image: ""
extra_args: {}
extra_binds: []
extra_env: []
kubelet:
generate_serving_certificate: true
extra_args:
feature-gates: "RotateKubeletServerCertificate=true"
protect-kernel-defaults: "true"
tls-cipher-suites: "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"
extra_binds: []
extra_env: []
cluster_domain: ""
infra_container_image: ""
cluster_dns_server: ""
fail_swap_on: false
kubeproxy:
image: ""
extra_args: {}
extra_binds: []
extra_env: []
network:
plugin: ""
options: {}
mtu: 0
node_selector: {}
authentication:
strategy: ""
sans: []
webhook: null
addons: |
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
name: ingress-nginx
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
name: default-psp-role
namespace: ingress-nginx
rules:
- apiGroups:
- extensions
resourceNames:
- default-psp
resources:
- podsecuritypolicies
verbs:
- use
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: RoleBinding
metadata:
name: default-psp-rolebinding
namespace: ingress-nginx
roleRef:
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: Role
name: default-psp-role
subjects:
- apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: Group
name: system:serviceaccounts
- apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: Group
name: system:authenticated
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
name: cattle-system
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
name: default-psp-role
namespace: cattle-system
rules:
- apiGroups:
- extensions
resourceNames:
- default-psp
resources:
- podsecuritypolicies
verbs:
- use
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: RoleBinding
metadata:
name: default-psp-rolebinding
namespace: cattle-system
roleRef:
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: Role
name: default-psp-role
subjects:
- apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: Group
name: system:serviceaccounts
- apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: Group
name: system:authenticated
---
apiVersion: policy/v1beta1
kind: PodSecurityPolicy
metadata:
name: restricted
spec:
requiredDropCapabilities:
- NET_RAW
privileged: false
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
defaultAllowPrivilegeEscalation: false
fsGroup:
rule: RunAsAny
runAsUser:
rule: MustRunAsNonRoot
seLinux:
rule: RunAsAny
supplementalGroups:
rule: RunAsAny
volumes:
- emptyDir
- secret
- persistentVolumeClaim
- downwardAPI
- configMap
- projected
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRole
metadata:
name: psp:restricted
rules:
- apiGroups:
- extensions
resourceNames:
- restricted
resources:
- podsecuritypolicies
verbs:
- use
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRoleBinding
metadata:
name: psp:restricted
roleRef:
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: ClusterRole
name: psp:restricted
subjects:
- apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: Group
name: system:serviceaccounts
- apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: Group
name: system:authenticated
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
name: tiller
namespace: kube-system
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRoleBinding
metadata:
name: tiller
roleRef:
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: ClusterRole
name: cluster-admin
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: tiller
namespace: kube-system
addons_include: []
system_images:
etcd: ""
alpine: ""
nginx_proxy: ""
cert_downloader: ""
kubernetes_services_sidecar: ""
kubedns: ""
dnsmasq: ""
kubedns_sidecar: ""
kubedns_autoscaler: ""
coredns: ""
coredns_autoscaler: ""
kubernetes: ""
flannel: ""
flannel_cni: ""
calico_node: ""
calico_cni: ""
calico_controllers: ""
calico_ctl: ""
calico_flexvol: ""
canal_node: ""
canal_cni: ""
canal_flannel: ""
canal_flexvol: ""
weave_node: ""
weave_cni: ""
pod_infra_container: ""
ingress: ""
ingress_backend: ""
metrics_server: ""
windows_pod_infra_container: ""
ssh_key_path: ""
ssh_cert_path: ""
ssh_agent_auth: false
authorization:
mode: ""
options: {}
ignore_docker_version: false
private_registries: []
ingress:
provider: ""
options: {}
node_selector: {}
extra_args: {}
dns_policy: ""
extra_envs: []
extra_volumes: []
extra_volume_mounts: []
cluster_name: ""
prefix_path: ""
addon_job_timeout: 0
bastion_host:
address: ""
port: ""
user: ""
ssh_key: ""
ssh_key_path: ""
ssh_cert: ""
ssh_cert_path: ""
monitoring:
provider: ""
options: {}
node_selector: {}
restore:
restore: false
snapshot_name: ""
dns: null
```
### Reference Hardened RKE Template configuration
The reference RKE Template provides the configuration needed to achieve a hardened install of Kubenetes.
RKE Templates are used to provision Kubernetes and define Rancher settings. Follow the Rancher
[documentaion](https://rancher.com/docs/rancher/v2.5/en/installation) for additional installation and RKE Template details.
``` yaml
#
# Cluster Config
#
default_pod_security_policy_template_id: restricted
docker_root_dir: /var/lib/docker
enable_cluster_alerting: false
enable_cluster_monitoring: false
enable_network_policy: true
#
# Rancher Config
#
rancher_kubernetes_engine_config:
addon_job_timeout: 30
addons: |-
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
name: ingress-nginx
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
name: default-psp-role
namespace: ingress-nginx
rules:
- apiGroups:
- extensions
resourceNames:
- default-psp
resources:
- podsecuritypolicies
verbs:
- use
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: RoleBinding
metadata:
name: default-psp-rolebinding
namespace: ingress-nginx
roleRef:
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: Role
name: default-psp-role
subjects:
- apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: Group
name: system:serviceaccounts
- apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: Group
name: system:authenticated
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
name: cattle-system
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
name: default-psp-role
namespace: cattle-system
rules:
- apiGroups:
- extensions
resourceNames:
- default-psp
resources:
- podsecuritypolicies
verbs:
- use
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: RoleBinding
metadata:
name: default-psp-rolebinding
namespace: cattle-system
roleRef:
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: Role
name: default-psp-role
subjects:
- apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: Group
name: system:serviceaccounts
- apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: Group
name: system:authenticated
---
apiVersion: policy/v1beta1
kind: PodSecurityPolicy
metadata:
name: restricted
spec:
requiredDropCapabilities:
- NET_RAW
privileged: false
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
defaultAllowPrivilegeEscalation: false
fsGroup:
rule: RunAsAny
runAsUser:
rule: MustRunAsNonRoot
seLinux:
rule: RunAsAny
supplementalGroups:
rule: RunAsAny
volumes:
- emptyDir
- secret
- persistentVolumeClaim
- downwardAPI
- configMap
- projected
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRole
metadata:
name: psp:restricted
rules:
- apiGroups:
- extensions
resourceNames:
- restricted
resources:
- podsecuritypolicies
verbs:
- use
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRoleBinding
metadata:
name: psp:restricted
roleRef:
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: ClusterRole
name: psp:restricted
subjects:
- apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: Group
name: system:serviceaccounts
- apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: Group
name: system:authenticated
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
name: tiller
namespace: kube-system
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRoleBinding
metadata:
name: tiller
roleRef:
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: ClusterRole
name: cluster-admin
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: tiller
namespace: kube-system
ignore_docker_version: true
kubernetes_version: v1.15.9-rancher1-1
#
# If you are using calico on AWS
#
# network:
# plugin: calico
# calico_network_provider:
# cloud_provider: aws
#
# # To specify flannel interface
#
# network:
# plugin: flannel
# flannel_network_provider:
# iface: eth1
#
# # To specify flannel interface for canal plugin
#
# network:
# plugin: canal
# canal_network_provider:
# iface: eth1
#
network:
mtu: 0
plugin: canal
#
# services:
# kube-api:
# service_cluster_ip_range: 10.43.0.0/16
# kube-controller:
# cluster_cidr: 10.42.0.0/16
# service_cluster_ip_range: 10.43.0.0/16
# kubelet:
# cluster_domain: cluster.local
# cluster_dns_server: 10.43.0.10
#
services:
etcd:
backup_config:
enabled: false
interval_hours: 12
retention: 6
safe_timestamp: false
creation: 12h
extra_args:
election-timeout: '5000'
heartbeat-interval: '500'
gid: 52034
retention: 72h
snapshot: false
uid: 52034
kube_api:
always_pull_images: false
audit_log:
enabled: true
event_rate_limit:
enabled: true
pod_security_policy: true
secrets_encryption_config:
enabled: true
service_node_port_range: 30000-32767
kube_controller:
extra_args:
bind-address: 127.0.0.1
address: 127.0.0.1
feature-gates: RotateKubeletServerCertificate=true
profiling: 'false'
terminated-pod-gc-threshold: '1000'
kubelet:
extra_args:
anonymous-auth: 'false'
event-qps: '0'
feature-gates: RotateKubeletServerCertificate=true
make-iptables-util-chains: 'true'
protect-kernel-defaults: 'true'
streaming-connection-idle-timeout: 1800s
tls-cipher-suites: >-
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
fail_swap_on: false
generate_serving_certificate: true
scheduler:
extra_args:
bind-address: 127.0.0.1
address: 127.0.0.1
profiling: 'false'
ssh_agent_auth: false
windows_prefered_cluster: false
```
### Hardened Reference Ubuntu 18.04 LTS **cloud-config**:
The reference **cloud-config** is generally used in cloud infrastructure environments to allow for
configuration management of compute instances. The reference config configures Ubuntu operating system level settings
needed before installing kubernetes.
``` yaml
#cloud-config
packages:
- curl
- jq
runcmd:
- sysctl -w vm.overcommit_memory=1
- sysctl -w kernel.panic=10
- sysctl -w kernel.panic_on_oops=1
- curl https://releases.rancher.com/install-docker/18.09.sh | sh
- usermod -aG docker ubuntu
- return=1; while [ $return != 0 ]; do sleep 2; docker ps; return=$?; done
- addgroup --gid 52034 etcd
- useradd --comment "etcd service account" --uid 52034 --gid 52034 etcd
write_files:
- path: /etc/sysctl.d/kubelet.conf
owner: root:root
permissions: "0644"
content: |
vm.overcommit_memory=1
kernel.panic=10
kernel.panic_on_oops=1
```
@@ -0,0 +1,578 @@
---
title: Hardening Guide with CIS 1.6 Benchmark
weight: 100
aliases:
- /rancher/v2.x/en/security/rancher-2.5/1.6-hardening-2.5/
---
This document provides prescriptive guidance for hardening a production installation of a RKE cluster to be used with Rancher v2.5.4. It outlines the configurations and controls required to address Kubernetes benchmark controls from the Center for Information Security (CIS).
> This hardening guide describes how to secure the nodes in your cluster, and it is recommended to follow this guide before installing Kubernetes.
This hardening guide is intended to be used for RKE clusters and associated with specific versions of the CIS Kubernetes Benchmark, Kubernetes, and Rancher:
Rancher Version | CIS Benchmark Version | Kubernetes Version
----------------|-----------------------|------------------
Rancher v2.5.4 | Benchmark 1.6 | Kubernetes v1.18
[Click here to download a PDF version of this document](https://releases.rancher.com/documents/security/2.5/Rancher_Hardening_Guide_CIS_1.6.pdf)
### Overview
This document provides prescriptive guidance for hardening a RKE cluster to be used for installing Rancher v2.5.4 with Kubernetes v1.18 or provisioning a RKE cluster with Kubernetes v1.18 to be used within Rancher v2.5.4. It outlines the configurations required to address Kubernetes benchmark controls from the Center for Information Security (CIS).
For more detail about evaluating a hardened cluster against the official CIS benchmark, refer to the [CIS 1.6 Benchmark - Self-Assessment Guide - Rancher v2.5.4]({{< baseurl >}}/rancher/v2.5/en/security/rancher-2.5/1.6-benchmark-2.5/).
#### Known Issues
- Rancher **exec shell** and **view logs** for pods are **not** functional in a CIS 1.6 hardened setup when only public IP is provided when registering custom nodes. This functionality requires a private IP to be provided when registering the custom nodes.
- When setting the `default_pod_security_policy_template_id:` to `restricted` Rancher creates **RoleBindings** and **ClusterRoleBindings** on the default service accounts. The CIS 1.6 5.1.5 check requires the default service accounts have no roles or cluster roles bound to it apart from the defaults. In addition the default service accounts should be configured such that it does not provide a service account token and does not have any explicit rights assignments.
Migration Rancher from 2.4 to 2.5. Addons were removed in HG 2.5, and therefore namespaces on migration may be not created on the downstream clusters. Pod may fail to run because of missing namesapce like ingress-nginx, cattle-system.
### Configure Kernel Runtime Parameters
The following `sysctl` configuration is recommended for all nodes type in the cluster. Set the following parameters in `/etc/sysctl.d/90-kubelet.conf`:
```ini
vm.overcommit_memory=1
vm.panic_on_oom=0
kernel.panic=10
kernel.panic_on_oops=1
kernel.keys.root_maxbytes=25000000
```
Run `sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/90-kubelet.conf` to enable the settings.
### Configure `etcd` user and group
A user account and group for the **etcd** service is required to be setup before installing RKE. The **uid** and **gid** for the **etcd** user will be used in the RKE **config.yml** to set the proper permissions for files and directories during installation time.
#### create `etcd` user and group
To create the **etcd** group run the following console commands.
The commands below use `52034` for **uid** and **gid** are for example purposes. Any valid unused **uid** or **gid** could also be used in lieu of `52034`.
```bash
groupadd --gid 52034 etcd
useradd --comment "etcd service account" --uid 52034 --gid 52034 etcd
```
Update the RKE **config.yml** with the **uid** and **gid** of the **etcd** user:
```yaml
services:
etcd:
gid: 52034
uid: 52034
```
#### Set `automountServiceAccountToken` to `false` for `default` service accounts
Kubernetes provides a default service account which is used by cluster workloads where no specific service account is assigned to the pod. Where access to the Kubernetes API from a pod is required, a specific service account should be created for that pod, and rights granted to that service account. The default service account should be configured such that it does not provide a service account token and does not have any explicit rights assignments.
For each namespace including **default** and **kube-system** on a standard RKE install the **default** service account must include this value:
```yaml
automountServiceAccountToken: false
```
Save the following yaml to a file called `account_update.yaml`
```yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
name: default
automountServiceAccountToken: false
```
Create a bash script file called `account_update.sh`. Be sure to `chmod +x account_update.sh` so the script has execute permissions.
```bash
#!/bin/bash -e
for namespace in $(kubectl get namespaces -A -o json | jq -r '.items[].metadata.name'); do
kubectl patch serviceaccount default -n ${namespace} -p "$(cat account_update.yaml)"
done
```
### Ensure that all Namespaces have Network Policies defined
Running different applications on the same Kubernetes cluster creates a risk of one
compromised application attacking a neighboring application. Network segmentation is
important to ensure that containers can communicate only with those they are supposed
to. A network policy is a specification of how selections of pods are allowed to
communicate with each other and other network endpoints.
Network Policies are namespace scoped. When a network policy is introduced to a given
namespace, all traffic not allowed by the policy is denied. However, if there are no network
policies in a namespace all traffic will be allowed into and out of the pods in that
namespace. To enforce network policies, a CNI (container network interface) plugin must be enabled.
This guide uses [canal](https://github.com/projectcalico/canal) to provide the policy enforcement.
Additional information about CNI providers can be found
[here](https://rancher.com/blog/2019/2019-03-21-comparing-kubernetes-cni-providers-flannel-calico-canal-and-weave/)
Once a CNI provider is enabled on a cluster a default network policy can be applied. For reference purposes a
**permissive** example is provide below. If you want to allow all traffic to all pods in a namespace
(even if policies are added that cause some pods to be treated as “isolated”),
you can create a policy that explicitly allows all traffic in that namespace. Save the following `yaml` as
`default-allow-all.yaml`. Additional [documentation](https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/network-policies/)
about network policies can be found on the Kubernetes site.
> This `NetworkPolicy` is not recommended for production use
```yaml
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: default-allow-all
spec:
podSelector: {}
ingress:
- {}
egress:
- {}
policyTypes:
- Ingress
- Egress
```
Create a bash script file called `apply_networkPolicy_to_all_ns.sh`. Be sure to
`chmod +x apply_networkPolicy_to_all_ns.sh` so the script has execute permissions.
```bash
#!/bin/bash -e
for namespace in $(kubectl get namespaces -A -o json | jq -r '.items[].metadata.name'); do
kubectl apply -f default-allow-all.yaml -n ${namespace}
done
```
Execute this script to apply the `default-allow-all.yaml` the **permissive** `NetworkPolicy` to all namespaces.
### Reference Hardened RKE `cluster.yml` configuration
The reference `cluster.yml` is used by the RKE CLI that provides the configuration needed to achieve a hardened install
of Rancher Kubernetes Engine (RKE). Install [documentation](https://rancher.com/docs/rke/latest/en/installation/) is
provided with additional details about the configuration items. This reference `cluster.yml` does not include the required **nodes** directive which will vary depending on your environment. Documentation for node configuration can be found here: https://rancher.com/docs/rke/latest/en/config-options/nodes
```yaml
# If you intend to deploy Kubernetes in an air-gapped environment,
# please consult the documentation on how to configure custom RKE images.
# https://rancher.com/docs/rke/latest/en/installation/
# the nodes directive is required and will vary depending on your environment
# documentation for node configuration can be found here:
# https://rancher.com/docs/rke/latest/en/config-options/nodes
nodes: []
services:
etcd:
image: ""
extra_args: {}
extra_binds: []
extra_env: []
win_extra_args: {}
win_extra_binds: []
win_extra_env: []
external_urls: []
ca_cert: ""
cert: ""
key: ""
path: ""
uid: 52034
gid: 52034
snapshot: false
retention: ""
creation: ""
backup_config: null
kube-api:
image: ""
extra_args: {}
extra_binds: []
extra_env: []
win_extra_args: {}
win_extra_binds: []
win_extra_env: []
service_cluster_ip_range: ""
service_node_port_range: ""
pod_security_policy: true
always_pull_images: false
secrets_encryption_config:
enabled: true
custom_config: null
audit_log:
enabled: true
configuration: null
admission_configuration: null
event_rate_limit:
enabled: true
configuration: null
kube-controller:
image: ""
extra_args:
feature-gates: RotateKubeletServerCertificate=true
extra_binds: []
extra_env: []
win_extra_args: {}
win_extra_binds: []
win_extra_env: []
cluster_cidr: ""
service_cluster_ip_range: ""
scheduler:
image: ""
extra_args: {}
extra_binds: []
extra_env: []
win_extra_args: {}
win_extra_binds: []
win_extra_env: []
kubelet:
image: ""
extra_args:
feature-gates: RotateKubeletServerCertificate=true
protect-kernel-defaults: "true"
tls-cipher-suites: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
extra_binds: []
extra_env: []
win_extra_args: {}
win_extra_binds: []
win_extra_env: []
cluster_domain: cluster.local
infra_container_image: ""
cluster_dns_server: ""
fail_swap_on: false
generate_serving_certificate: true
kubeproxy:
image: ""
extra_args: {}
extra_binds: []
extra_env: []
win_extra_args: {}
win_extra_binds: []
win_extra_env: []
network:
plugin: ""
options: {}
mtu: 0
node_selector: {}
update_strategy: null
authentication:
strategy: ""
sans: []
webhook: null
addons: |
apiVersion: policy/v1beta1
kind: PodSecurityPolicy
metadata:
name: restricted
spec:
requiredDropCapabilities:
- NET_RAW
privileged: false
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
defaultAllowPrivilegeEscalation: false
fsGroup:
rule: RunAsAny
runAsUser:
rule: MustRunAsNonRoot
seLinux:
rule: RunAsAny
supplementalGroups:
rule: RunAsAny
volumes:
- emptyDir
- secret
- persistentVolumeClaim
- downwardAPI
- configMap
- projected
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRole
metadata:
name: psp:restricted
rules:
- apiGroups:
- extensions
resourceNames:
- restricted
resources:
- podsecuritypolicies
verbs:
- use
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRoleBinding
metadata:
name: psp:restricted
roleRef:
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: ClusterRole
name: psp:restricted
subjects:
- apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: Group
name: system:serviceaccounts
- apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: Group
name: system:authenticated
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: default-allow-all
spec:
podSelector: {}
ingress:
- {}
egress:
- {}
policyTypes:
- Ingress
- Egress
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
name: default
automountServiceAccountToken: false
addons_include: []
system_images:
etcd: ""
alpine: ""
nginx_proxy: ""
cert_downloader: ""
kubernetes_services_sidecar: ""
kubedns: ""
dnsmasq: ""
kubedns_sidecar: ""
kubedns_autoscaler: ""
coredns: ""
coredns_autoscaler: ""
nodelocal: ""
kubernetes: ""
flannel: ""
flannel_cni: ""
calico_node: ""
calico_cni: ""
calico_controllers: ""
calico_ctl: ""
calico_flexvol: ""
canal_node: ""
canal_cni: ""
canal_controllers: ""
canal_flannel: ""
canal_flexvol: ""
weave_node: ""
weave_cni: ""
pod_infra_container: ""
ingress: ""
ingress_backend: ""
metrics_server: ""
windows_pod_infra_container: ""
ssh_key_path: ""
ssh_cert_path: ""
ssh_agent_auth: false
authorization:
mode: ""
options: {}
ignore_docker_version: false
kubernetes_version: v1.18.12-rancher1-1
private_registries: []
ingress:
provider: ""
options: {}
node_selector: {}
extra_args: {}
dns_policy: ""
extra_envs: []
extra_volumes: []
extra_volume_mounts: []
update_strategy: null
http_port: 0
https_port: 0
network_mode: ""
cluster_name:
cloud_provider:
name: ""
prefix_path: ""
win_prefix_path: ""
addon_job_timeout: 0
bastion_host:
address: ""
port: ""
user: ""
ssh_key: ""
ssh_key_path: ""
ssh_cert: ""
ssh_cert_path: ""
monitoring:
provider: ""
options: {}
node_selector: {}
update_strategy: null
replicas: null
restore:
restore: false
snapshot_name: ""
dns: null
upgrade_strategy:
max_unavailable_worker: ""
max_unavailable_controlplane: ""
drain: null
node_drain_input: null
```
### Reference Hardened RKE Template configuration
The reference RKE Template provides the configuration needed to achieve a hardened install of Kubenetes.
RKE Templates are used to provision Kubernetes and define Rancher settings. Follow the Rancher
[documentaion](https://rancher.com/docs/rancher/v2.5/en/installation) for additional installation and RKE Template details.
```yaml
#
# Cluster Config
#
default_pod_security_policy_template_id: restricted
docker_root_dir: /var/lib/docker
enable_cluster_alerting: false
enable_cluster_monitoring: false
enable_network_policy: true
#
# Rancher Config
#
rancher_kubernetes_engine_config:
addon_job_timeout: 45
ignore_docker_version: true
kubernetes_version: v1.18.12-rancher1-1
#
# If you are using calico on AWS
#
# network:
# plugin: calico
# calico_network_provider:
# cloud_provider: aws
#
# # To specify flannel interface
#
# network:
# plugin: flannel
# flannel_network_provider:
# iface: eth1
#
# # To specify flannel interface for canal plugin
#
# network:
# plugin: canal
# canal_network_provider:
# iface: eth1
#
network:
mtu: 0
plugin: canal
rotate_encryption_key: false
#
# services:
# kube-api:
# service_cluster_ip_range: 10.43.0.0/16
# kube-controller:
# cluster_cidr: 10.42.0.0/16
# service_cluster_ip_range: 10.43.0.0/16
# kubelet:
# cluster_domain: cluster.local
# cluster_dns_server: 10.43.0.10
#
services:
etcd:
backup_config:
enabled: false
interval_hours: 12
retention: 6
safe_timestamp: false
creation: 12h
extra_args:
election-timeout: '5000'
heartbeat-interval: '500'
gid: 52034
retention: 72h
snapshot: false
uid: 52034
kube_api:
always_pull_images: false
audit_log:
enabled: true
event_rate_limit:
enabled: true
pod_security_policy: true
secrets_encryption_config:
enabled: true
service_node_port_range: 30000-32767
kube_controller:
extra_args:
feature-gates: RotateKubeletServerCertificate=true
bind-address: 127.0.0.1
address: 127.0.0.1
kubelet:
extra_args:
feature-gates: RotateKubeletServerCertificate=true
protect-kernel-defaults: 'true'
tls-cipher-suites: >-
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
fail_swap_on: false
generate_serving_certificate: true
scheduler:
extra_args:
bind-address: 127.0.0.1
address: 127.0.0.1
ssh_agent_auth: false
upgrade_strategy:
max_unavailable_controlplane: '1'
max_unavailable_worker: 10%
windows_prefered_cluster: false
```
### Hardened Reference Ubuntu 20.04 LTS **cloud-config**:
The reference **cloud-config** is generally used in cloud infrastructure environments to allow for
configuration management of compute instances. The reference config configures Ubuntu operating system level settings
needed before installing kubernetes.
```yaml
#cloud-config
apt:
sources:
docker.list:
source: deb [arch=amd64] http://download.docker.com/linux/ubuntu $RELEASE stable
keyid: 9DC858229FC7DD38854AE2D88D81803C0EBFCD88
system_info:
default_user:
groups:
- docker
write_files:
- path: "/etc/apt/preferences.d/docker"
owner: root:root
permissions: '0600'
content: |
Package: docker-ce
Pin: version 5:19*
Pin-Priority: 800
- path: "/etc/sysctl.d/90-kubelet.conf"
owner: root:root
permissions: '0644'
content: |
vm.overcommit_memory=1
vm.panic_on_oom=0
kernel.panic=10
kernel.panic_on_oops=1
kernel.keys.root_maxbytes=25000000
package_update: true
packages:
- docker-ce
- docker-ce-cli
- containerd.io
runcmd:
- sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/90-kubelet.conf
- groupadd --gid 52034 etcd
- useradd --comment "etcd service account" --uid 52034 --gid 52034 etcd
```
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
---
title: Self-Assessment and Hardening Guides for Rancher v2.5
shortTitle: Rancher v2.5 Guides
weight: 1
---
Rancher v2.5 introduced the capability to deploy Rancher on any Kubernetes cluster. For that reason, we now provide separate security hardening guides for Rancher deployments on each of Rancher's Kubernetes distributions.
- [Rancher Kubernetes Distributions](#rancher-kubernetes-distributions)
- [Hardening Guides and Benchmark Versions](#hardening-guides-and-benchmark-versions)
- [RKE Guides](#rke-guides)
- [RKE2 Guides](#rke2-guides)
- [K3s Guides](#k3s)
- [Rancher with SELinux](#rancher-with-selinux)
# Rancher Kubernetes Distributions
Rancher has the following Kubernetes distributions:
- [**RKE,**]({{<baseurl>}}/rke/latest/en/) Rancher Kubernetes Engine, is a CNCF-certified Kubernetes distribution that runs entirely within Docker containers.
- [**K3s,**]({{<baseurl>}}/k3s/latest/en/) is a fully conformant, lightweight Kubernetes distribution. It is easy to install, with half the memory of upstream Kubernetes, all in a binary of less than 100 MB.
- [**RKE2**](https://docs.rke2.io/) is a fully conformant Kubernetes distribution that focuses on security and compliance within the U.S. Federal Government sector.
To harden a Kubernetes cluster outside of Rancher's distributions, refer to your Kubernetes provider docs.
# Hardening Guides and Benchmark Versions
These guides have been tested along with the Rancher v2.5 release. Each self-assessment guide is accompanied with a hardening guide and tested on a specific Kubernetes version and CIS benchmark version. If a CIS benchmark has not been validated for your Kubernetes version, you can choose to use the existing guides until a newer version is added.
### RKE Guides
Kubernetes Version | CIS Benchmark Version | Self Assessment Guide | Hardening Guides
---|---|---|---
Kubernetes v1.15+ | CIS v1.5 | [Link](./1.5-benchmark-2.5) | [Link](./1.5-hardening-2.5)
Kubernetes v1.18+ | CIS v1.6 | [Link](./1.6-benchmark-2.5) | [Link](./1.6-hardening-2.5)
### RKE2 Guides
Kubernetes Version | CIS Benchmark Version | Self Assessment Guide | Hardening Guides
---|---|---|---
Kubernetes v1.18 | CIS v1.5 | [Link](https://docs.rke2.io/security/cis_self_assessment15/) | [Link](https://docs.rke2.io/security/hardening_guide/)
Kubernetes v1.20 | CIS v1.6 | [Link](https://docs.rke2.io/security/cis_self_assessment16/) | [Link](https://docs.rke2.io/security/hardening_guide/)
### K3s Guides
Kubernetes Version | CIS Benchmark Version | Self Assessment Guide | Hardening Guide
---|---|---|---
Kubernetes v1.17, v1.18, & v1.19 | CIS v1.5 | [Link]({{<baseurl>}}/k3s/latest/en/security/self_assessment/) | [Link]({{<baseurl>}}/k3s/latest/en/security/hardening_guide/)
# Rancher with SELinux
_Available as of v2.5.8_
[Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-Enhanced_Linux) is a security enhancement to Linux. After being historically used by government agencies, SELinux is now industry standard and is enabled by default on CentOS 7 and 8.
To use Rancher with SELinux, we recommend installing the `rancher-selinux` RPM according to the instructions on [this page.]({{<baseurl>}}/rancher/v2.5/en/security/selinux/#installing-the-rancher-selinux-rpm)
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
---
title: Security Scans
weight: 299
---
The documentation about CIS security scans has moved [here.]({{<baseurl>}}/rancher/v2.5/en/cis-scans)
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
---
title: Security
weight: 20
aliases:
- /rancher/v2.x/en/security/rancher-2.5/
---
<table width="100%">
<tr style="vertical-align: top;">
<td width="30%" style="border: none;">
<h4>Security policy</h4>
<p style="padding: 8px">Rancher Labs supports responsible disclosure, and endeavours to resolve all issues in a reasonable time frame. </p>
</td>
<td width="30%" style="border: none;">
<h4>Reporting process</h4>
<p style="padding: 8px">Please submit possible security issues by emailing <a href="mailto:security-rancher@suse.com">security-rancher@suse.com</a> .</p>
</td>
<td width="30%" style="border: none;">
<h4>Announcements</h4>
<p style="padding: 8px">Subscribe to the <a href="https://forums.rancher.com/c/announcements">Rancher announcements forum</a> for release updates.</p>
</td>
</tr>
</table>
Security is at the heart of all Rancher features. From integrating with all the popular authentication tools and services, to an enterprise grade [RBAC capability,]({{<baseurl>}}/rancher/v2.5/en/admin-settings/rbac) Rancher makes your Kubernetes clusters even more secure.
On this page, we provide security related documentation along with resources to help you secure your Rancher installation and your downstream Kubernetes clusters:
- [Running a CIS security scan on a Kubernetes cluster](#running-a-cis-security-scan-on-a-kubernetes-cluster)
- [SELinux RPM](#selinux-rpm)
- [Guide to hardening Rancher installations](#rancher-hardening-guide)
- [The CIS Benchmark and self-assessment](#the-cis-benchmark-and-self-assessment)
- [Third-party penetration test reports](#third-party-penetration-test-reports)
- [Rancher Security Advisories and CVEs](#rancher-security-advisories-and-cves)
- [Kubernetes Security Best Practices](#kubernetes-security-best-practices)
### Running a CIS Security Scan on a Kubernetes Cluster
Rancher leverages [kube-bench](https://github.com/aquasecurity/kube-bench) to run a security scan to check whether Kubernetes is deployed according to security best practices as defined in the [CIS](https://www.cisecurity.org/cis-benchmarks/) (Center for Internet Security) Kubernetes Benchmark.
The CIS Kubernetes Benchmark is a reference document that can be used to establish a secure configuration baseline for Kubernetes.
The Center for Internet Security (CIS) is a 501(c\)(3) non-profit organization, formed in October 2000, with a mission to "identify, develop, validate, promote, and sustain best practice solutions for cyber defense and build and lead communities to enable an environment of trust in cyberspace".
CIS Benchmarks are best practices for the secure configuration of a target system. CIS Benchmarks are developed through the generous volunteer efforts of subject matter experts, technology vendors, public and private community members, and the CIS Benchmark Development team.
The Benchmark provides recommendations of two types: Automated and Manual. We run tests related to only Automated recommendations.
When Rancher runs a CIS security scan on a cluster, it generates a report showing the results of each test, including a summary with the number of passed, skipped and failed tests. The report also includes remediation steps for any failed tests.
For details, refer to the section on [security scans]({{<baseurl>}}/rancher/v2.5/en/cis-scans).
### SELinux RPM
[Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-Enhanced_Linux) is a security enhancement to Linux. After being historically used by government agencies, SELinux is now industry standard and is enabled by default on CentOS 7 and 8.
We provide two RPMs (Red Hat packages) that enable Rancher products to function properly on SELinux-enforcing hosts: `rancher-selinux` and `rke2-selinux`. For details, see [this page]({{<baseurl>}}/rancher/v2.5/en/security/selinux).
### Rancher Hardening Guide
The Rancher Hardening Guide is based on controls and best practices found in the <a href="https://www.cisecurity.org/benchmark/kubernetes/" target="_blank">CIS Kubernetes Benchmark</a> from the Center for Internet Security.
The hardening guides provide prescriptive guidance for hardening a production installation of Rancher. See Rancher's guides for [Self Assessment of the CIS Kubernetes Benchmark](#the-cis-benchmark-and-self-sssessment) for the full list of security controls.
> The hardening guides describe how to secure the nodes in your cluster, and it is recommended to follow a hardening guide before installing Kubernetes.
Each version of the hardening guide is intended to be used with specific versions of the CIS Kubernetes Benchmark, Kubernetes, and Rancher.
### The CIS Benchmark and Self-Assessment
The benchmark self-assessment is a companion to the Rancher security hardening guide. While the hardening guide shows you how to harden the cluster, the benchmark guide is meant to help you evaluate the level of security of the hardened cluster.
Because Rancher and RKE install Kubernetes services as Docker containers, many of the control verification checks in the CIS Kubernetes Benchmark don't apply. This guide will walk through the various controls and provide updated example commands to audit compliance in Rancher created clusters. The original benchmark documents can be downloaded from the [CIS website](https://www.cisecurity.org/benchmark/kubernetes/).
Each version of Rancher's self-assessment guide corresponds to specific versions of the hardening guide, Rancher, Kubernetes, and the CIS Benchmark.
### Third-party Penetration Test Reports
Rancher periodically hires third parties to perform security audits and penetration tests of the Rancher 2.x software stack. The environments under test follow the Rancher provided hardening guides at the time of the testing. Results are posted when the third party has also verified fixes classified MEDIUM or above.
Results:
- [Cure53 Pen Test - July 2019](https://releases.rancher.com/documents/security/pen-tests/2019/RAN-01-cure53-report.final.pdf)
- [Untamed Theory Pen Test - March 2019](https://releases.rancher.com/documents/security/pen-tests/2019/UntamedTheory-Rancher_SecurityAssessment-20190712_v5.pdf)
### Rancher Security Advisories and CVEs
Rancher is committed to informing the community of security issues in our products. For the list of CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) for issues we have resolved, refer to [this page.](./cve)
### Kubernetes Security Best Practices
For recommendations on securing your Kubernetes cluster, refer to the [Kubernetes Security Best Practices](./best-practices) guide.
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
---
title: SELinux RPM
weight: 4
---
_Available as of v2.5.8_
[Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-Enhanced_Linux) is a security enhancement to Linux.
Developed by Red Hat, it is an implementation of mandatory access controls (MAC) on Linux. Mandatory access controls allow an administrator of a system to define how applications and users can access different resources such as files, devices, networks and inter-process communication. SELinux also enhances security by making an OS restrictive by default.
After being historically used by government agencies, SELinux is now industry standard and is enabled by default on CentOS 7 and 8. To check whether SELinux is enabled and enforcing on your system, use `getenforce`:
```
# getenforce
Enforcing
```
We provide two RPMs (Red Hat packages) that enable Rancher products to function properly on SELinux-enforcing hosts: `rancher-selinux` and `rke2-selinux`.
- [rancher-selinux](#rancher-selinux)
- [rke2-selinux](#rke2-selinux)
- [Installing the rancher-selinux RPM](#installing-the-rancher-selinux-rpm)
- [Configuring the Logging Application to Work with SELinux](#configuring-the-logging-application-to-work-with-selinux)
# rancher-selinux
To allow Rancher to work with SELinux, some functionality has to be manually enabled for the SELinux nodes. To help with that, Rancher provides a SELinux RPM.
As of v2.5.8, the `rancher-selinux` RPM only contains policies for the [rancher-logging application.](https://github.com/rancher/charts/tree/dev-v2.5/charts/rancher-logging)
The `rancher-selinux` GitHub repository is [here.](https://github.com/rancher/rancher-selinux)
# rke2-selinux
rke2-selinux provides policies for RKE2. It is installed automatically when the RKE2 installer script detects that it is running on an RPM-based distro.
The `rke2-selinux` GitHub repository is [here.](https://github.com/rancher/rke2-selinux)
For more information about installing RKE2 on SELinux-enabled hosts, see the [RKE2 documentation.](https://docs.rke2.io/install/methods/#rpm)
# Installing the rancher-selinux RPM
> **Requirements:** The rancher-selinux RPM was tested with CentOS 7 and 8.
### 1. Set up the yum repo
Set up the yum repo to install `rancher-selinux` directly on all hosts in the cluster.
In order to use the RPM repository, on a CentOS 7 or RHEL 7 system, run the following bash snippet:
```
# cat << EOF > /etc/yum.repos.d/rancher.repo
[rancher]
name=Rancher
baseurl=https://rpm.rancher.io/rancher/production/centos/7/noarch
enabled=1
gpgcheck=1
gpgkey=https://rpm.rancher.io/public.key
EOF
```
In order to use the RPM repository, on a CentOS 8 or RHEL 8 system, run the following bash snippet:
```
# cat << EOF > /etc/yum.repos.d/rancher.repo
[rancher]
name=Rancher
baseurl=https://rpm.rancher.io/rancher/production/centos/8/noarch
enabled=1
gpgcheck=1
gpgkey=https://rpm.rancher.io/public.key
EOF
```
### 2. Installing the RPM
Install the RPM:
```
yum -y install rancher-selinux
```
# Configuring the Logging Application to Work with SELinux
> **Requirements:** Logging v2 was tested with SELinux on RHEL/CentOS 7 and 8.
Applications do not automatically work once the `rancher-selinux` RPM is installed on the host. They need to be configured to run in an allowed SELinux container domain provided by the RPM.
To configure the `rancher-logging` chart to be SELinux aware, change `global.seLinux.enabled` to true in the `values.yaml` when installing the chart.