mirror of
https://github.com/rancher/rancher-docs.git
synced 2026-09-27 05:28:22 +00:00
Remove intermediate /en folder
This commit is contained in:
Billy Tat
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: Kubernetes Security Best Practices
|
||||
weight: 5
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### Restricting cloud metadata API access
|
||||
|
||||
Cloud providers such as AWS, Azure, DigitalOcean or GCP often expose metadata services locally to instances. By default, this endpoint is accessible by pods running on a cloud instance, including pods in hosted Kubernetes providers such as EKS, AKS, DigitalOcean Kubernetes or GKE, and can contain cloud credentials for that node, provisioning data such as kubelet credentials, or other sensitive data. To mitigate this risk when running on a cloud platform, follow the [Kubernetes security recommendations](https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/securing-a-cluster/#restricting-cloud-metadata-api-access): limit permissions given to instance credentials, use network policies to restrict pod access to the metadata API, and avoid using provisioning data to deliver secrets.
|
||||
|
||||
It is advised to consult your cloud provider's security best practices for further recommendations and specific details on how to restrict access to cloud instance metadata API.
|
||||
|
||||
Further references: MITRE ATT&CK knowledge base on - [Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/005/).
|
||||
+655
@@ -0,0 +1,655 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: RKE Hardening Guide with CIS v1.6 Benchmark
|
||||
weight: 100
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- /rancher/v2.6/en/security/hardening-guides/1.6-hardening-2.6/
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
This document provides prescriptive guidance for hardening a production installation of a RKE cluster to be used with Rancher v2.6. It outlines the configurations and controls required to address Kubernetes benchmark controls from the Center for Information Security (CIS).
|
||||
|
||||
:::note
|
||||
|
||||
This hardening guide describes how to secure the nodes in your cluster, and it is recommended to follow this guide before installing Kubernetes.
|
||||
|
||||
:::
|
||||
|
||||
This hardening guide is intended to be used for RKE clusters and associated with specific versions of the CIS Kubernetes Benchmark, Kubernetes, and Rancher:
|
||||
|
||||
| Rancher Version | CIS Benchmark Version | Kubernetes Version |
|
||||
| --------------- | --------------------- | ------------------ |
|
||||
| Rancher v2.6 | Benchmark v1.6 | Kubernetes v1.18 up to v1.23 |
|
||||
|
||||
[Click here to download a PDF version of this document](https://releases.rancher.com/documents/security/2.6/Rancher_v2-6_CIS_v1-6_Hardening_Guide.pdf).
|
||||
|
||||
- [Overview](#overview)
|
||||
- [Configure Kernel Runtime Parameters](#configure-kernel-runtime-parameters)
|
||||
- [Configure `etcd` user and group](#configure-etcd-user-and-group)
|
||||
- [Configure `default` service account](#configure-default-service-account)
|
||||
- [Configure Network Policy](#configure-network-policy)
|
||||
- [Reference Hardened RKE `cluster.yml` Configuration](#reference-hardened-rke-cluster-yml-configuration)
|
||||
- [Reference Hardened RKE Template Configuration](#reference-hardened-rke-template-configuration)
|
||||
- [Reference Hardened **cloud-config** Configuration](#reference-hardened-cloud-config-configuration)
|
||||
|
||||
### Overview
|
||||
|
||||
This document provides prescriptive guidance for hardening a RKE cluster to be used for installing Rancher v2.6 with Kubernetes v1.18 up to v1.23 or provisioning a RKE cluster with Kubernetes v1.18 up to v1.23 to be used within Rancher v2.6. It outlines the configurations required to address Kubernetes benchmark controls from the Center for Information Security (CIS).
|
||||
|
||||
For more details about evaluating a hardened cluster against the official CIS benchmark, refer to the [CIS 1.6 Benchmark - Self-Assessment Guide - Rancher v2.6](security/hardening-guides/1.6-benchmark-2.6/).
|
||||
|
||||
#### Known Issues
|
||||
|
||||
- Rancher **exec shell** and **view logs** for pods are **not** functional in a CIS v1.6 hardened setup when only public IP is provided when registering custom nodes. This functionality requires a private IP to be provided when registering the custom nodes.
|
||||
- When setting the `default_pod_security_policy_template_id:` to `restricted` or `restricted-noroot`, based on the pod security policies (PSP) [provided](../../../how-to-guides/advanced-user-guides/authentication-permissions-and-global-configuration/create-pod-security-policies.md) by Rancher, Rancher creates **RoleBindings** and **ClusterRoleBindings** on the default service accounts. The CIS v1.6 check 5.1.5 requires that the default service accounts have no roles or cluster roles bound to it apart from the defaults. In addition the default service accounts should be configured such that it does not provide a service account token and does not have any explicit rights assignments.
|
||||
|
||||
### Configure Kernel Runtime Parameters
|
||||
|
||||
The following `sysctl` configuration is recommended for all nodes type in the cluster. Set the following parameters in `/etc/sysctl.d/90-kubelet.conf`:
|
||||
|
||||
```ini
|
||||
vm.overcommit_memory=1
|
||||
vm.panic_on_oom=0
|
||||
kernel.panic=10
|
||||
kernel.panic_on_oops=1
|
||||
kernel.keys.root_maxbytes=25000000
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Run `sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/90-kubelet.conf` to enable the settings.
|
||||
|
||||
### Configure `etcd` user and group
|
||||
|
||||
A user account and group for the **etcd** service is required to be setup before installing RKE. The **uid** and **gid** for the **etcd** user will be used in the RKE **config.yml** to set the proper permissions for files and directories during installation time.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Create `etcd` user and group
|
||||
|
||||
To create the **etcd** user and group run the following console commands. The commands below use `52034` for **uid** and **gid** are for example purposes. Any valid unused **uid** or **gid** could also be used in lieu of `52034`.
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
groupadd --gid 52034 etcd
|
||||
useradd --comment "etcd service account" --uid 52034 --gid 52034 etcd --shell /usr/sbin/nologin
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Update the RKE **config.yml** with the **uid** and **gid** of the **etcd** user:
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
services:
|
||||
etcd:
|
||||
gid: 52034
|
||||
uid: 52034
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Configure `default` Service Account
|
||||
|
||||
#### Set `automountServiceAccountToken` to `false` for `default` service accounts
|
||||
|
||||
Kubernetes provides a default service account which is used by cluster workloads where no specific service account is assigned to the pod. Where access to the Kubernetes API from a pod is required, a specific service account should be created for that pod, and rights granted to that service account. The default service account should be configured such that it does not provide a service account token and does not have any explicit rights assignments.
|
||||
|
||||
For each namespace including **default** and **kube-system** on a standard RKE install, the **default** service account must include this value:
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
automountServiceAccountToken: false
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Save the following configuration to a file called `account_update.yaml`.
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
apiVersion: v1
|
||||
kind: ServiceAccount
|
||||
metadata:
|
||||
name: default
|
||||
automountServiceAccountToken: false
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Create a bash script file called `account_update.sh`. Be sure to `chmod +x account_update.sh` so the script has execute permissions.
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
#!/bin/bash -e
|
||||
|
||||
for namespace in $(kubectl get namespaces -A -o=jsonpath="{.items[*]['metadata.name']}"); do
|
||||
kubectl patch serviceaccount default -n ${namespace} -p "$(cat account_update.yaml)"
|
||||
done
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Configure Network Policy
|
||||
|
||||
#### Ensure that all Namespaces have Network Policies defined
|
||||
|
||||
Running different applications on the same Kubernetes cluster creates a risk of one compromised application attacking a neighboring application. Network segmentation is important to ensure that containers can communicate only with those they are supposed to. A network policy is a specification of how selections of pods are allowed to communicate with each other and other network endpoints.
|
||||
|
||||
Network Policies are namespace scoped. When a network policy is introduced to a given namespace, all traffic not allowed by the policy is denied. However, if there are no network policies in a namespace all traffic will be allowed into and out of the pods in that namespace. To enforce network policies, a CNI (container network interface) plugin must be enabled. This guide uses [Canal](https://github.com/projectcalico/canal) to provide the policy enforcement. Additional information about CNI providers can be found [here](https://www.suse.com/c/rancher_blog/comparing-kubernetes-cni-providers-flannel-calico-canal-and-weave/).
|
||||
|
||||
Once a CNI provider is enabled on a cluster a default network policy can be applied. For reference purposes a **permissive** example is provided below. If you want to allow all traffic to all pods in a namespace (even if policies are added that cause some pods to be treated as “isolated”), you can create a policy that explicitly allows all traffic in that namespace. Save the following configuration as `default-allow-all.yaml`. Additional [documentation](https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/network-policies/) about network policies can be found on the Kubernetes site.
|
||||
|
||||
:::note
|
||||
|
||||
This `NetworkPolicy` is just an example and is not recommended for production use.
|
||||
|
||||
:::
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
---
|
||||
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
|
||||
kind: NetworkPolicy
|
||||
metadata:
|
||||
name: default-allow-all
|
||||
spec:
|
||||
podSelector: {}
|
||||
ingress:
|
||||
- {}
|
||||
egress:
|
||||
- {}
|
||||
policyTypes:
|
||||
- Ingress
|
||||
- Egress
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Create a bash script file called `apply_networkPolicy_to_all_ns.sh`. Be sure to `chmod +x apply_networkPolicy_to_all_ns.sh` so the script has execute permissions.
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
#!/bin/bash -e
|
||||
|
||||
for namespace in $(kubectl get namespaces -A -o=jsonpath="{.items[*]['metadata.name']}"); do
|
||||
kubectl apply -f default-allow-all.yaml -n ${namespace}
|
||||
done
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Execute this script to apply the `default-allow-all.yaml` configuration with the **permissive** `NetworkPolicy` to all namespaces.
|
||||
|
||||
### Reference Hardened RKE `cluster.yml` Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
The reference `cluster.yml` is used by the RKE CLI that provides the configuration needed to achieve a hardened install of Rancher Kubernetes Engine (RKE). RKE install [documentation](https://rancher.com/docs/rke/latest/en/installation/) is provided with additional details about the configuration items. This reference `cluster.yml` does not include the required **nodes** directive which will vary depending on your environment. Documentation for node configuration in RKE can be found [here](https://rancher.com/docs/rke/latest/en/config-options/nodes/).
|
||||
|
||||
:::note Important:
|
||||
|
||||
For a Kubernetes v1.18 cluster, the configuration `spec.volumes: 'ephemeral'` should be removed from the `PodSecurityPolicy`, since it's not supported in this Kubernetes release.
|
||||
|
||||
:::
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
# If you intend to deploy Kubernetes in an air-gapped environment,
|
||||
# please consult the documentation on how to configure custom RKE images.
|
||||
# https://rancher.com/docs/rke/latest/en/installation/ .
|
||||
|
||||
# The nodes directive is required and will vary depending on your environment.
|
||||
# Documentation for node configuration can be found here:
|
||||
# https://rancher.com/docs/rke/latest/en/config-options/nodes/
|
||||
nodes: []
|
||||
services:
|
||||
etcd:
|
||||
image: ""
|
||||
extra_args: {}
|
||||
extra_binds: []
|
||||
extra_env: []
|
||||
win_extra_args: {}
|
||||
win_extra_binds: []
|
||||
win_extra_env: []
|
||||
external_urls: []
|
||||
ca_cert: ""
|
||||
cert: ""
|
||||
key: ""
|
||||
path: ""
|
||||
uid: 52034
|
||||
gid: 52034
|
||||
snapshot: false
|
||||
retention: ""
|
||||
creation: ""
|
||||
backup_config: null
|
||||
kube-api:
|
||||
image: ""
|
||||
extra_args: {}
|
||||
extra_binds: []
|
||||
extra_env: []
|
||||
win_extra_args: {}
|
||||
win_extra_binds: []
|
||||
win_extra_env: []
|
||||
service_cluster_ip_range: ""
|
||||
service_node_port_range: ""
|
||||
pod_security_policy: true
|
||||
always_pull_images: false
|
||||
secrets_encryption_config:
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
custom_config: null
|
||||
audit_log:
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
configuration: null
|
||||
admission_configuration: null
|
||||
event_rate_limit:
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
configuration: null
|
||||
kube-controller:
|
||||
image: ""
|
||||
extra_args:
|
||||
feature-gates: RotateKubeletServerCertificate=true
|
||||
tls-cipher-suites: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
|
||||
bind-address: 127.0.0.1
|
||||
extra_binds: []
|
||||
extra_env: []
|
||||
win_extra_args: {}
|
||||
win_extra_binds: []
|
||||
win_extra_env: []
|
||||
cluster_cidr: ""
|
||||
service_cluster_ip_range: ""
|
||||
scheduler:
|
||||
image: ""
|
||||
extra_args:
|
||||
tls-cipher-suites: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
|
||||
bind-address: 127.0.0.1
|
||||
extra_binds: []
|
||||
extra_env: []
|
||||
win_extra_args: {}
|
||||
win_extra_binds: []
|
||||
win_extra_env: []
|
||||
kubelet:
|
||||
image: ""
|
||||
extra_args:
|
||||
feature-gates: RotateKubeletServerCertificate=true
|
||||
protect-kernel-defaults: true
|
||||
tls-cipher-suites: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
|
||||
extra_binds: []
|
||||
extra_env: []
|
||||
win_extra_args: {}
|
||||
win_extra_binds: []
|
||||
win_extra_env: []
|
||||
cluster_domain: cluster.local
|
||||
infra_container_image: ""
|
||||
cluster_dns_server: ""
|
||||
fail_swap_on: false
|
||||
generate_serving_certificate: true
|
||||
kubeproxy:
|
||||
image: ""
|
||||
extra_args: {}
|
||||
extra_binds: []
|
||||
extra_env: []
|
||||
win_extra_args: {}
|
||||
win_extra_binds: []
|
||||
win_extra_env: []
|
||||
network:
|
||||
plugin: ""
|
||||
options: {}
|
||||
mtu: 0
|
||||
node_selector: {}
|
||||
update_strategy: null
|
||||
authentication:
|
||||
strategy: ""
|
||||
sans: []
|
||||
webhook: null
|
||||
addons: |
|
||||
# Upstream Kubernetes restricted PSP policy
|
||||
# https://github.com/kubernetes/website/blob/564baf15c102412522e9c8fc6ef2b5ff5b6e766c/content/en/examples/policy/restricted-psp.yaml
|
||||
apiVersion: policy/v1beta1
|
||||
kind: PodSecurityPolicy
|
||||
metadata:
|
||||
name: restricted-noroot
|
||||
spec:
|
||||
privileged: false
|
||||
# Required to prevent escalations to root.
|
||||
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
|
||||
requiredDropCapabilities:
|
||||
- ALL
|
||||
# Allow core volume types.
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
- 'configMap'
|
||||
- 'emptyDir'
|
||||
- 'projected'
|
||||
- 'secret'
|
||||
- 'downwardAPI'
|
||||
# Assume that ephemeral CSI drivers & persistentVolumes set up by the cluster admin are safe to use.
|
||||
- 'csi'
|
||||
- 'persistentVolumeClaim'
|
||||
- 'ephemeral'
|
||||
hostNetwork: false
|
||||
hostIPC: false
|
||||
hostPID: false
|
||||
runAsUser:
|
||||
# Require the container to run without root privileges.
|
||||
rule: 'MustRunAsNonRoot'
|
||||
seLinux:
|
||||
# This policy assumes the nodes are using AppArmor rather than SELinux.
|
||||
rule: 'RunAsAny'
|
||||
supplementalGroups:
|
||||
rule: 'MustRunAs'
|
||||
ranges:
|
||||
# Forbid adding the root group.
|
||||
- min: 1
|
||||
max: 65535
|
||||
fsGroup:
|
||||
rule: 'MustRunAs'
|
||||
ranges:
|
||||
# Forbid adding the root group.
|
||||
- min: 1
|
||||
max: 65535
|
||||
readOnlyRootFilesystem: false
|
||||
---
|
||||
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
|
||||
kind: ClusterRole
|
||||
metadata:
|
||||
name: psp:restricted-noroot
|
||||
rules:
|
||||
- apiGroups:
|
||||
- extensions
|
||||
resourceNames:
|
||||
- restricted-noroot
|
||||
resources:
|
||||
- podsecuritypolicies
|
||||
verbs:
|
||||
- use
|
||||
---
|
||||
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
|
||||
kind: ClusterRoleBinding
|
||||
metadata:
|
||||
name: psp:restricted-noroot
|
||||
roleRef:
|
||||
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
|
||||
kind: ClusterRole
|
||||
name: psp:restricted-noroot
|
||||
subjects:
|
||||
- apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
|
||||
kind: Group
|
||||
name: system:serviceaccounts
|
||||
- apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
|
||||
kind: Group
|
||||
name: system:authenticated
|
||||
---
|
||||
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
|
||||
kind: NetworkPolicy
|
||||
metadata:
|
||||
name: default-allow-all
|
||||
spec:
|
||||
podSelector: {}
|
||||
ingress:
|
||||
- {}
|
||||
egress:
|
||||
- {}
|
||||
policyTypes:
|
||||
- Ingress
|
||||
- Egress
|
||||
---
|
||||
apiVersion: v1
|
||||
kind: ServiceAccount
|
||||
metadata:
|
||||
name: default
|
||||
automountServiceAccountToken: false
|
||||
addons_include: []
|
||||
system_images:
|
||||
etcd: ""
|
||||
alpine: ""
|
||||
nginx_proxy: ""
|
||||
cert_downloader: ""
|
||||
kubernetes_services_sidecar: ""
|
||||
kubedns: ""
|
||||
dnsmasq: ""
|
||||
kubedns_sidecar: ""
|
||||
kubedns_autoscaler: ""
|
||||
coredns: ""
|
||||
coredns_autoscaler: ""
|
||||
nodelocal: ""
|
||||
kubernetes: ""
|
||||
flannel: ""
|
||||
flannel_cni: ""
|
||||
calico_node: ""
|
||||
calico_cni: ""
|
||||
calico_controllers: ""
|
||||
calico_ctl: ""
|
||||
calico_flexvol: ""
|
||||
canal_node: ""
|
||||
canal_cni: ""
|
||||
canal_controllers: ""
|
||||
canal_flannel: ""
|
||||
canal_flexvol: ""
|
||||
weave_node: ""
|
||||
weave_cni: ""
|
||||
pod_infra_container: ""
|
||||
ingress: ""
|
||||
ingress_backend: ""
|
||||
metrics_server: ""
|
||||
windows_pod_infra_container: ""
|
||||
ssh_key_path: ""
|
||||
ssh_cert_path: ""
|
||||
ssh_agent_auth: false
|
||||
authorization:
|
||||
mode: ""
|
||||
options: {}
|
||||
ignore_docker_version: false
|
||||
kubernetes_version: ""
|
||||
private_registries: []
|
||||
ingress:
|
||||
provider: ""
|
||||
options: {}
|
||||
node_selector: {}
|
||||
extra_args: {}
|
||||
dns_policy: ""
|
||||
extra_envs: []
|
||||
extra_volumes: []
|
||||
extra_volume_mounts: []
|
||||
update_strategy: null
|
||||
http_port: 0
|
||||
https_port: 0
|
||||
network_mode: ""
|
||||
cluster_name:
|
||||
cloud_provider:
|
||||
name: ""
|
||||
prefix_path: ""
|
||||
win_prefix_path: ""
|
||||
addon_job_timeout: 0
|
||||
bastion_host:
|
||||
address: ""
|
||||
port: ""
|
||||
user: ""
|
||||
ssh_key: ""
|
||||
ssh_key_path: ""
|
||||
ssh_cert: ""
|
||||
ssh_cert_path: ""
|
||||
monitoring:
|
||||
provider: ""
|
||||
options: {}
|
||||
node_selector: {}
|
||||
update_strategy: null
|
||||
replicas: null
|
||||
restore:
|
||||
restore: false
|
||||
snapshot_name: ""
|
||||
dns: null
|
||||
upgrade_strategy:
|
||||
max_unavailable_worker: ""
|
||||
max_unavailable_controlplane: ""
|
||||
drain: null
|
||||
node_drain_input: null
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Reference Hardened RKE Template Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
The reference RKE template provides the configuration needed to achieve a hardened install of Kubernetes. RKE templates are used to provision Kubernetes and define Rancher settings. Follow the Rancher [documentation](../../../pages-for-subheaders/installation-and-upgrade.md) for additional installation and RKE template details.
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Cluster Config
|
||||
#
|
||||
default_pod_security_policy_template_id: restricted-noroot
|
||||
docker_root_dir: /var/lib/docker
|
||||
enable_cluster_alerting: false
|
||||
enable_cluster_monitoring: false
|
||||
enable_network_policy: true
|
||||
local_cluster_auth_endpoint:
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
name: ''
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Rancher Config
|
||||
#
|
||||
rancher_kubernetes_engine_config:
|
||||
addon_job_timeout: 45
|
||||
authentication:
|
||||
strategy: x509
|
||||
dns:
|
||||
nodelocal:
|
||||
ip_address: ''
|
||||
node_selector: null
|
||||
update_strategy: {}
|
||||
enable_cri_dockerd: false
|
||||
ignore_docker_version: true
|
||||
#
|
||||
# # Currently only nginx ingress provider is supported.
|
||||
# # To disable ingress controller, set `provider: none`
|
||||
# # To enable ingress on specific nodes, use the node_selector, eg:
|
||||
# provider: nginx
|
||||
# node_selector:
|
||||
# app: ingress
|
||||
#
|
||||
ingress:
|
||||
default_backend: false
|
||||
default_ingress_class: true
|
||||
http_port: 0
|
||||
https_port: 0
|
||||
provider: nginx
|
||||
kubernetes_version: v1.21.8-rancher1-1
|
||||
monitoring:
|
||||
provider: metrics-server
|
||||
replicas: 1
|
||||
#
|
||||
# If you are using calico on AWS
|
||||
#
|
||||
# network:
|
||||
# plugin: calico
|
||||
# calico_network_provider:
|
||||
# cloud_provider: aws
|
||||
#
|
||||
# # To specify flannel interface
|
||||
#
|
||||
# network:
|
||||
# plugin: flannel
|
||||
# flannel_network_provider:
|
||||
# iface: eth1
|
||||
#
|
||||
# # To specify flannel interface for canal plugin
|
||||
#
|
||||
# network:
|
||||
# plugin: canal
|
||||
# canal_network_provider:
|
||||
# iface: eth1
|
||||
#
|
||||
network:
|
||||
mtu: 0
|
||||
options:
|
||||
flannel_backend_type: vxlan
|
||||
plugin: canal
|
||||
rotate_encryption_key: false
|
||||
#
|
||||
# services:
|
||||
# kube-api:
|
||||
# service_cluster_ip_range: 10.43.0.0/16
|
||||
# kube-controller:
|
||||
# cluster_cidr: 10.42.0.0/16
|
||||
# service_cluster_ip_range: 10.43.0.0/16
|
||||
# kubelet:
|
||||
# cluster_domain: cluster.local
|
||||
# cluster_dns_server: 10.43.0.10
|
||||
#
|
||||
services:
|
||||
scheduler:
|
||||
extra_args:
|
||||
tls-cipher-suites: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
|
||||
bind-address: 127.0.0.1
|
||||
etcd:
|
||||
backup_config:
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
interval_hours: 12
|
||||
retention: 6
|
||||
safe_timestamp: false
|
||||
timeout: 300
|
||||
creation: 12h
|
||||
extra_args:
|
||||
election-timeout: 5000
|
||||
heartbeat-interval: 500
|
||||
retention: 72h
|
||||
snapshot: false
|
||||
uid: 52034
|
||||
gid: 52034
|
||||
kube_api:
|
||||
always_pull_images: false
|
||||
audit_log:
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
event_rate_limit:
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
pod_security_policy: true
|
||||
secrets_encryption_config:
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
service_node_port_range: 30000-32767
|
||||
kube-controller:
|
||||
extra_args:
|
||||
feature-gates: RotateKubeletServerCertificate=true
|
||||
tls-cipher-suites: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
|
||||
bind-address: 127.0.0.1
|
||||
kubelet:
|
||||
extra_args:
|
||||
feature-gates: RotateKubeletServerCertificate=true
|
||||
protect-kernel-defaults: true
|
||||
tls-cipher-suites: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
|
||||
fail_swap_on: false
|
||||
generate_serving_certificate: true
|
||||
ssh_agent_auth: false
|
||||
upgrade_strategy:
|
||||
max_unavailable_controlplane: '1'
|
||||
max_unavailable_worker: 10%
|
||||
windows_prefered_cluster: false
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Reference Hardened **cloud-config** Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
A **cloud-config** configuration file is generally used in cloud infrastructure environments to allow for configuration management of compute instances. The reference config configures SUSE Linux Enterprise Server (SLES), openSUSE Leap, Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) and Ubuntu operating system level settings needed before installing Kubernetes.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Reference Hardened **cloud-config** for SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 (SLES 15) and openSUSE Leap 15
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
#cloud-config
|
||||
system_info:
|
||||
default_user:
|
||||
groups:
|
||||
- docker
|
||||
write_files:
|
||||
- path: "/etc/sysctl.d/90-kubelet.conf"
|
||||
owner: root:root
|
||||
permissions: '0644'
|
||||
content: |
|
||||
vm.overcommit_memory=1
|
||||
vm.panic_on_oom=0
|
||||
kernel.panic=10
|
||||
kernel.panic_on_oops=1
|
||||
kernel.keys.root_maxbytes=25000000
|
||||
package_update: true
|
||||
ssh_pwauth: false
|
||||
runcmd:
|
||||
# Docker should already be installed in SLES 15 SP3
|
||||
- zypper install docker containerd
|
||||
- systemctl daemon-reload
|
||||
- systemctl enable docker.service
|
||||
- systemctl start --no-block docker.service
|
||||
- sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/90-kubelet.conf
|
||||
- groupadd --gid 52034 etcd
|
||||
- useradd --comment "etcd service account" --uid 52034 --gid 52034 etcd --shell /usr/sbin/nologin
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
#### Reference Hardened **cloud-config** for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 (RHEL 8) and Ubuntu 20.04 LTS
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
#cloud-config
|
||||
system_info:
|
||||
default_user:
|
||||
groups:
|
||||
- docker
|
||||
write_files:
|
||||
- path: "/etc/sysctl.d/90-kubelet.conf"
|
||||
owner: root:root
|
||||
permissions: '0644'
|
||||
content: |
|
||||
vm.overcommit_memory=1
|
||||
vm.panic_on_oom=0
|
||||
kernel.panic=10
|
||||
kernel.panic_on_oops=1
|
||||
kernel.keys.root_maxbytes=25000000
|
||||
package_update: true
|
||||
ssh_pwauth: false
|
||||
runcmd:
|
||||
# Install Docker from Rancher's Docker installation scripts - github.com/rancher/install-docker
|
||||
- curl https://releases.rancher.com/install-docker/20.10.sh | sh
|
||||
- sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/90-kubelet.conf
|
||||
- groupadd --gid 52034 etcd
|
||||
- useradd --comment "etcd service account" --uid 52034 --gid 52034 etcd --shell /usr/sbin/nologin
|
||||
```
|
||||
+3104
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
+418
@@ -0,0 +1,418 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: RKE2 Hardening Guide with CIS v1.6 Benchmark
|
||||
weight: 100
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
This document provides prescriptive guidance for hardening a production installation of a RKE2 cluster to be provisioned with Rancher v2.6.5. It outlines the configurations and controls required to address Kubernetes benchmark controls from the Center for Information Security (CIS).
|
||||
|
||||
:::note
|
||||
|
||||
This hardening guide describes how to secure the nodes in your cluster, and it is recommended to follow this guide before installing Kubernetes.
|
||||
|
||||
:::
|
||||
|
||||
This hardening guide is intended to be used for RKE2 clusters and associated with specific versions of the CIS Kubernetes Benchmark, Kubernetes, and Rancher:
|
||||
|
||||
| Rancher Version | CIS Benchmark Version | Kubernetes Version |
|
||||
| --------------- | --------------------- | ------------------ |
|
||||
| Rancher v2.6.5+ | Benchmark v1.6 | Kubernetes v1.21 up to v1.23 |
|
||||
|
||||
[Click here to download a PDF version of this document](https://releases.rancher.com/documents/security/2.6/Rancher_RKE2_v2-6_CIS_v1-6_Hardening_Guide.pdf).
|
||||
|
||||
- [Overview](#overview)
|
||||
- [Host-level requirements](#host-level-requirements)
|
||||
- [Setting up hosts](#setting-up-hosts)
|
||||
- [Kubernetes runtime requirements](#kubernetes-runtime-requirements)
|
||||
- [API Server audit configuration](#api-server-audit-configuration)
|
||||
- [Known issues](#known-issues)
|
||||
- [Reference Hardened RKE2 Template Configuration](#reference-hardened-rke2-template-configuration)
|
||||
- [Conclusion](#conclusion)
|
||||
|
||||
### Overview
|
||||
|
||||
This document provides prescriptive guidance for hardening a RKE2 cluster to be provisioned through Rancher v2.6.5+ with Kubernetes v1.21 up to v1.23. It outlines the configurations required to address Kubernetes benchmark controls from the Center for Information Security (CIS).
|
||||
|
||||
For more details about evaluating a hardened RKE2 cluster against the official CIS benchmark, refer to the [RKE2 - CIS 1.6 Benchmark - Self-Assessment Guide - Rancher v2.6](rke2-self-assessment-guide-with-cis-v1.6-benchmark.md).
|
||||
|
||||
RKE2 is designed to be "hardened by default" and pass the majority of the Kubernetes CIS controls without modification. There are a few notable exceptions to this that require manual intervention to fully pass the CIS Benchmark:
|
||||
|
||||
1. RKE2 will not modify the host operating system. Therefore, you, the operator, must make a few host-level modifications.
|
||||
2. Certain CIS policy controls for `PodSecurityPolicies` and `NetworkPolicies` will restrict the functionality of the cluster. You must opt into having RKE2 configuring these out of the box.
|
||||
|
||||
To help ensure these above requirements are met, RKE2 can be started with the `profile` flag set to `cis-1.6`. This flag generally does two things:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Checks that host-level requirements have been met. If they haven't, RKE2 will exit with a fatal error describing the unmet requirements.
|
||||
2. Configures runtime pod security policies and network policies that allow the cluster to pass associated controls.
|
||||
|
||||
:::note
|
||||
|
||||
The profile's flag only valid values are `cis-1.5` or `cis-1.6`. It accepts a string value to allow for other profiles in the future.
|
||||
|
||||
:::
|
||||
|
||||
The following section outlines the specific actions that are taken when the `profile` flag is set to `cis-1.6`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Host-level requirements
|
||||
|
||||
There are two areas of host-level requirements: kernel parameters and etcd process/directory configuration. These are outlined in this section.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Ensure `protect-kernel-defaults` is set
|
||||
|
||||
This is a kubelet flag that will cause the kubelet to exit if the required kernel parameters are unset or are set to values that are different from the kubelet's defaults.
|
||||
|
||||
When the `profile` flag is set, RKE2 will set the flag to `true`.
|
||||
|
||||
:::caution
|
||||
|
||||
`protect-kernel-defaults` is exposed as a configuration flag for RKE2. If you have set `profile` to "cis-1.x" and `protect-kernel-defaults` to `false` explicitly, RKE2 will exit with an error.
|
||||
|
||||
:::
|
||||
|
||||
RKE2 will also check the same kernel parameters that the kubelet does and exit with an error following the same rules as the kubelet. This is done as a convenience to help the operator more quickly and easily identify what kernel parameters are violating the kubelet defaults.
|
||||
|
||||
Both `protect-kernel-defaults` and `profile` flags can be set in RKE2 template configuration file.
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
spec:
|
||||
rkeConfig:
|
||||
machineSelectorConfig:
|
||||
- config:
|
||||
profile: cis-1.6
|
||||
protect-kernel-defaults: true
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
#### Ensure etcd is configured properly
|
||||
|
||||
The CIS Benchmark requires that the etcd data directory be owned by the `etcd` user and group. This implicitly requires the etcd process to be ran as the host-level `etcd` user. To achieve this, RKE2 takes several steps when started with a valid "cis-1.x" profile:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Check that the `etcd` user and group exists on the host. If they don't, exit with an error.
|
||||
2. Create etcd's data directory with `etcd` as the user and group owner.
|
||||
3. Ensure the etcd process is ran as the `etcd` user and group by setting the etcd static pod's `SecurityContext` appropriately.
|
||||
|
||||
### Setting up hosts
|
||||
|
||||
This section gives you the commands necessary to configure your host to meet the above requirements.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Set kernel parameters
|
||||
|
||||
The following `sysctl` configuration is recommended for all nodes type in the cluster. Set the following parameters in `/etc/sysctl.d/90-kubelet.conf`:
|
||||
|
||||
```ini
|
||||
vm.panic_on_oom=0
|
||||
vm.overcommit_memory=1
|
||||
kernel.panic=10
|
||||
kernel.panic_on_oops=1
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Run `sudo sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/90-kubelet.conf` to enable the settings.
|
||||
|
||||
Please perform this step only on fresh installations, before actually deploying RKE2 through Rancher.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Create the etcd user
|
||||
|
||||
On some Linux distributions, the `useradd` command will not create a group. The `-U` flag is included below to account for that. This flag tells `useradd` to create a group with the same name as the user.
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
sudo useradd -r -c "etcd user" -s /sbin/nologin -M etcd -U
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Kubernetes runtime requirements
|
||||
|
||||
The runtime requirements to pass the CIS Benchmark are centered around pod security and network policies. These are outlined in this section.
|
||||
|
||||
#### `PodSecurityPolicies`
|
||||
|
||||
RKE2 always runs with the `PodSecurityPolicy` admission controller turned on. However, when it is **not** started with a valid "cis-1.x" profile, RKE2 will put an unrestricted policy in place that allows Kubernetes to run as though the `PodSecurityPolicy` admission controller was not enabled.
|
||||
|
||||
When ran with a valid "cis-1.x" profile, RKE2 will put a much more restrictive set of policies in place. These policies meet the requirements outlined in section 5.2 of the CIS Benchmark.
|
||||
|
||||
> The Kubernetes control plane components and critical additions such as CNI, DNS, and Ingress are ran as pods in the `kube-system` namespace. Therefore, this namespace will have a policy that is less restrictive so that these components can run properly.
|
||||
|
||||
#### `NetworkPolicies`
|
||||
|
||||
When ran with a valid "cis-1.x" profile, RKE2 will put `NetworkPolicies` in place that passes the CIS Benchmark for Kubernetes' built-in namespaces. These namespaces are: `kube-system`, `kube-public`, `kube-node-lease`, and `default`.
|
||||
|
||||
The `NetworkPolicy` used will only allow pods within the same namespace to talk to each other. The notable exception to this is that it allows DNS requests to be resolved.
|
||||
|
||||
:::note
|
||||
|
||||
Operators must manage network policies as normal for additional namespaces that are created.
|
||||
|
||||
:::
|
||||
#### Configure `default` service account
|
||||
|
||||
**Set `automountServiceAccountToken` to `false` for `default` service accounts**
|
||||
|
||||
Kubernetes provides a `default` service account which is used by cluster workloads where no specific service account is assigned to the pod. Where access to the Kubernetes API from a pod is required, a specific service account should be created for that pod, and rights granted to that service account. The `default` service account should be configured such that it does not provide a service account token and does not have any explicit rights assignments.
|
||||
|
||||
For each namespace including `default` and `kube-system` on a standard RKE2 install, the `default` service account must include this value:
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
automountServiceAccountToken: false
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
For namespaces created by the cluster operator, the following script and configuration file can be used to configure the `default` service account.
|
||||
|
||||
The configuration bellow must be saved to a file called `account_update.yaml`.
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
apiVersion: v1
|
||||
kind: ServiceAccount
|
||||
metadata:
|
||||
name: default
|
||||
automountServiceAccountToken: false
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Create a bash script file called `account_update.sh`. Be sure to `sudo chmod +x account_update.sh` so the script has execute permissions.
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
#!/bin/bash -e
|
||||
|
||||
for namespace in $(kubectl get namespaces -A -o=jsonpath="{.items[*]['metadata.name']}"); do
|
||||
echo -n "Patching namespace $namespace - "
|
||||
kubectl patch serviceaccount default -n ${namespace} -p "$(cat account_update.yaml)"
|
||||
done
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Execute this script to apply the `account_update.yaml` configuration to `default` service account in all namespaces.
|
||||
|
||||
### API Server audit configuration
|
||||
|
||||
CIS requirements 1.2.22 to 1.2.25 are related to configuring audit logs for the API Server. When RKE2 is started with the `profile` flag set to `cis-1.6`, it will automatically configure hardened `--audit-log-` parameters in the API Server to pass those CIS checks.
|
||||
|
||||
RKE2's default audit policy is configured to not log requests in the API Server. This is done to allow cluster operators flexibility to customize an audit policy that suits their auditing requirements and needs, as these are specific to each users' environment and policies.
|
||||
|
||||
A default audit policy is created by RKE2 when started with the `profile` flag set to `cis-1.6`. The policy is defined in `/etc/rancher/rke2/audit-policy.yaml`.
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
apiVersion: audit.k8s.io/v1
|
||||
kind: Policy
|
||||
metadata:
|
||||
creationTimestamp: null
|
||||
rules:
|
||||
- level: None
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
To start logging requests to the API Server, at least `level` parameter must be modified, for example, to `Metadata`. Detailed information about policy configuration for the API server can be found in the Kubernetes [documentation](https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/debug-application-cluster/audit/).
|
||||
|
||||
After adapting the audit policy, RKE2 must be restarted to load the new configuration.
|
||||
|
||||
```shell
|
||||
sudo systemctl restart rke2-server.service
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
API Server audit logs will be written to `/var/lib/rancher/rke2/server/logs/audit.log`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Known issues
|
||||
|
||||
The following are controls that RKE2 currently does not pass. Each gap will be explained and whether it can be passed through manual operator intervention or if it will be addressed in a future release.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Control 1.1.12
|
||||
Ensure that the etcd data directory ownership is set to `etcd:etcd`.
|
||||
|
||||
**Rationale**
|
||||
etcd is a highly-available key-value store used by Kubernetes deployments for persistent storage of all of its REST API objects. This data directory should be protected from any unauthorized reads or writes. It should be owned by `etcd:etcd`.
|
||||
|
||||
**Remediation**
|
||||
This can be remediated by creating an `etcd` user and group as described above.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Control 5.1.5
|
||||
Ensure that default service accounts are not actively used
|
||||
|
||||
**Rationale** Kubernetes provides a `default` service account which is used by cluster workloads where no specific service account is assigned to the pod.
|
||||
|
||||
Where access to the Kubernetes API from a pod is required, a specific service account should be created for that pod, and rights granted to that service account.
|
||||
|
||||
The `default` service account should be configured such that it does not provide a service account token and does not have any explicit rights assignments.
|
||||
|
||||
This can be remediated by updating the `automountServiceAccountToken` field to `false` for the `default` service account in each namespace.
|
||||
|
||||
**Remediation**
|
||||
You can manually update this field on service accounts in your cluster to pass the control as described above.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Control 5.3.2
|
||||
Ensure that all Namespaces have Network Policies defined
|
||||
|
||||
**Rationale**
|
||||
Running different applications on the same Kubernetes cluster creates a risk of one compromised application attacking a neighboring application. Network segmentation is important to ensure that containers can communicate only with those they are supposed to. A network policy is a specification of how selections of pods are allowed to communicate with each other and other network endpoints.
|
||||
|
||||
Network Policies are namespace scoped. When a network policy is introduced to a given namespace, all traffic not allowed by the policy is denied. However, if there are no network policies in a namespace all traffic will be allowed into and out of the pods in that namespace.
|
||||
|
||||
**Remediation**
|
||||
This can be remediated by setting `profile: "cis-1.6"` in RKE2 template configuration file. An example can be found below.
|
||||
|
||||
### Reference Hardened RKE2 Template Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
The reference template configuration is used in Rancher to create a hardened RKE2 custom cluster. This reference does not include other required **cluster configuration** directives which will vary depending on your environment.
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
apiVersion: provisioning.cattle.io/v1
|
||||
kind: Cluster
|
||||
metadata:
|
||||
name: <replace_with_cluster_name>
|
||||
annotations:
|
||||
{}
|
||||
# key: string
|
||||
labels:
|
||||
{}
|
||||
# key: string
|
||||
namespace: fleet-default
|
||||
spec:
|
||||
defaultPodSecurityPolicyTemplateName: ''
|
||||
kubernetesVersion: <replace_with_kubernetes_version>
|
||||
localClusterAuthEndpoint:
|
||||
caCerts: ''
|
||||
enabled: false
|
||||
fqdn: ''
|
||||
rkeConfig:
|
||||
chartValues:
|
||||
rke2-canal:
|
||||
{}
|
||||
etcd:
|
||||
disableSnapshots: false
|
||||
s3:
|
||||
# bucket: string
|
||||
# cloudCredentialName: string
|
||||
# endpoint: string
|
||||
# endpointCA: string
|
||||
# folder: string
|
||||
# region: string
|
||||
# skipSSLVerify: boolean
|
||||
snapshotRetention: 5
|
||||
snapshotScheduleCron: 0 */5 * * *
|
||||
machineGlobalConfig:
|
||||
cni: canal
|
||||
machinePools:
|
||||
# - cloudCredentialSecretName: string
|
||||
# controlPlaneRole: boolean
|
||||
# displayName: string
|
||||
# drainBeforeDelete: boolean
|
||||
# etcdRole: boolean
|
||||
# labels:
|
||||
# key: string
|
||||
# machineConfigRef:
|
||||
# apiVersion: string
|
||||
# fieldPath: string
|
||||
# kind: string
|
||||
# name: string
|
||||
# namespace: string
|
||||
# resourceVersion: string
|
||||
# uid: string
|
||||
# machineDeploymentAnnotations:
|
||||
# key: string
|
||||
# machineDeploymentLabels:
|
||||
# key: string
|
||||
# machineOS: string
|
||||
# maxUnhealthy: string
|
||||
# name: string
|
||||
# nodeStartupTimeout: string
|
||||
# paused: boolean
|
||||
# quantity: int
|
||||
# rollingUpdate:
|
||||
# maxSurge: string
|
||||
# maxUnavailable: string
|
||||
# taints:
|
||||
# - effect: string
|
||||
# key: string
|
||||
# timeAdded: string
|
||||
# value: string
|
||||
# unhealthyNodeTimeout: string
|
||||
# unhealthyRange: string
|
||||
# workerRole: boolean
|
||||
machineSelectorConfig:
|
||||
- config:
|
||||
profile: cis-1.6
|
||||
protect-kernel-defaults: true
|
||||
# - config:
|
||||
#
|
||||
# machineLabelSelector:
|
||||
# matchExpressions:
|
||||
# - key: string
|
||||
# operator: string
|
||||
# values:
|
||||
# - string
|
||||
# matchLabels:
|
||||
# key: string
|
||||
registries:
|
||||
configs:
|
||||
{}
|
||||
#authConfigSecretName: string
|
||||
# caBundle: string
|
||||
# insecureSkipVerify: boolean
|
||||
# tlsSecretName: string
|
||||
mirrors:
|
||||
{}
|
||||
#endpoint:
|
||||
# - string
|
||||
# rewrite:
|
||||
# key: string
|
||||
upgradeStrategy:
|
||||
controlPlaneConcurrency: 10%
|
||||
controlPlaneDrainOptions:
|
||||
# deleteEmptyDirData: boolean
|
||||
# disableEviction: boolean
|
||||
# enabled: boolean
|
||||
# force: boolean
|
||||
# gracePeriod: int
|
||||
# ignoreDaemonSets: boolean
|
||||
# ignoreErrors: boolean
|
||||
# postDrainHooks:
|
||||
# - annotation: string
|
||||
# preDrainHooks:
|
||||
# - annotation: string
|
||||
# skipWaitForDeleteTimeoutSeconds: int
|
||||
# timeout: int
|
||||
workerConcurrency: 10%
|
||||
workerDrainOptions:
|
||||
# deleteEmptyDirData: boolean
|
||||
# disableEviction: boolean
|
||||
# enabled: boolean
|
||||
# force: boolean
|
||||
# gracePeriod: int
|
||||
# ignoreDaemonSets: boolean
|
||||
# ignoreErrors: boolean
|
||||
# postDrainHooks:
|
||||
# - annotation: string
|
||||
# preDrainHooks:
|
||||
# - annotation: string
|
||||
# skipWaitForDeleteTimeoutSeconds: int
|
||||
# timeout: int
|
||||
# additionalManifest: string
|
||||
# etcdSnapshotCreate:
|
||||
# generation: int
|
||||
# etcdSnapshotRestore:
|
||||
# generation: int
|
||||
# name: string
|
||||
# restoreRKEConfig: string
|
||||
# infrastructureRef:
|
||||
# apiVersion: string
|
||||
# fieldPath: string
|
||||
# kind: string
|
||||
# name: string
|
||||
# namespace: string
|
||||
# resourceVersion: string
|
||||
# uid: string
|
||||
# provisionGeneration: int
|
||||
# rotateCertificates:
|
||||
# generation: int
|
||||
# services:
|
||||
# - string
|
||||
# rotateEncryptionKeys:
|
||||
# generation: int
|
||||
machineSelectorConfig:
|
||||
- config: {}
|
||||
# agentEnvVars:
|
||||
# - name: string
|
||||
# value: string
|
||||
# cloudCredentialSecretName: string
|
||||
# clusterAPIConfig:
|
||||
# clusterName: string
|
||||
# defaultClusterRoleForProjectMembers: string
|
||||
# enableNetworkPolicy: boolean
|
||||
# redeploySystemAgentGeneration: int
|
||||
__clone: true
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Conclusion
|
||||
|
||||
If you have followed this guide, your RKE2 custom cluster provisioned by Rancher will be configured to pass the CIS Kubernetes Benchmark. You can review our RKE2 CIS Benchmark Self-Assessment Guide [v1.6](rke2-self-assessment-guide-with-cis-v1.6-benchmark.md) to understand how we verified each of the benchmarks and how you can do the same on your cluster.
|
||||
+3330
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: Security Advisories and CVEs
|
||||
weight: 300
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- /rancher/v2.x/en/security/cve/
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Rancher is committed to informing the community of security issues in our products. Rancher will publish security advisories and CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) for issues we have resolved. New security advisories are also published in Rancher's GitHub [security page](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/advisories).
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Description | Date | Resolution |
|
||||
|----|-------------|------|------------|
|
||||
| [CVE-2022-21951](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/advisories/GHSA-vrph-m5jj-c46c) | This vulnerability only affects customers using [Weave](https://rancher.com/docs/rancher/v2.6/en/faq/networking/cni-providers/#weave) Container Network Interface (CNI) when configured through [RKE templates](https://rancher.com/docs/rancher/v2.6/en/admin-settings/rke-templates/). A vulnerability was discovered in Rancher versions 2.5.0 up to and including 2.5.13, and 2.6.0 up to and including 2.6.4, where a user interface (UI) issue with RKE templates does not include a value for the Weave password when Weave is chosen as the CNI. If a cluster is created based on the mentioned template, and Weave is configured as the CNI, no password will be created for [network encryption](https://www.weave.works/docs/net/latest/tasks/manage/security-untrusted-networks/) in Weave; therefore, network traffic in the cluster will be sent unencrypted. | 24 May 2022 | [Rancher v2.6.5](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.6.5) and [Rancher v2.5.14](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.5.14) |
|
||||
| [CVE-2021-36784](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/advisories/GHSA-jwvr-vv7p-gpwq) | A vulnerability was discovered in Rancher versions from 2.5.0 up to and including 2.5.12 and from 2.6.0 up to and including 2.6.3 which allows users who have create or update permissions on [Global Roles](https://rancher.com/docs/rancher/v2.6/en/admin-settings/rbac/) to escalate their permissions, or those of another user, to admin-level permissions. Global Roles grant users Rancher-wide permissions, such as the ability to create clusters. In the identified versions of Rancher, when users are given permission to edit or create Global Roles, they are not restricted to only granting permissions which they already posses. This vulnerability affects customers who utilize non-admin users that are able to create or edit Global Roles. The most common use case for this scenario is the `restricted-admin` role. | 14 Apr 2022 | [Rancher v2.6.4](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.6.4) and [Rancher v2.5.13](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.5.13) |
|
||||
| [CVE-2021-4200](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/advisories/GHSA-hx8w-ghh8-r4xf) | This vulnerability only affects customers using the `restricted-admin` role in Rancher. A vulnerability was discovered in Rancher versions from 2.5.0 up to and including 2.5.12 and from 2.6.0 up to and including 2.6.3 where the `global-data` role in `cattle-global-data` namespace grants write access to the Catalogs. Since each user with any level of catalog access was bound to the `global-data` role, this grants write access to templates (`CatalogTemplates`) and template versions (`CatalogTemplateVersions`) for any user with any level of catalog access. New users created in Rancher are by default assigned to the `user` role (standard user), which is not designed to grant write catalog access. This vulnerability effectively elevates the privilege of any user to write access for the catalog template and catalog template version resources. | 14 Apr 2022 | [Rancher v2.6.4](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.6.4) and [Rancher v2.5.13](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.5.13) |
|
||||
| [GHSA-wm2r-rp98-8pmh](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/advisories/GHSA-wm2r-rp98-8pmh) | This vulnerability only affects customers using [Fleet](https://rancher.com/docs/rancher/v2.6/en/deploy-across-clusters/fleet/) for continuous delivery with authenticated Git and/or Helm repositories. An issue was discovered in `go-getter` library in versions prior to [`v1.5.11`](https://github.com/hashicorp/go-getter/releases/tag/v1.5.11) that exposes SSH private keys in base64 format due to a failure in redacting such information from error messages. The vulnerable version of this library is used in Rancher through Fleet in versions of Fleet prior to [`v0.3.9`](https://github.com/rancher/fleet/releases/tag/v0.3.9). This issue affects Rancher versions 2.5.0 up to and including 2.5.12 and from 2.6.0 up to and including 2.6.3. The issue was found and reported by Dagan Henderson from Raft Engineering. | 14 Apr 2022 | [Rancher v2.6.4](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.6.4) and [Rancher v2.5.13](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.5.13) |
|
||||
| [CVE-2021-36778](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/advisories/GHSA-4fc7-hc63-7fjg) | A vulnerability was discovered in Rancher versions from 2.5.0 up to and including 2.5.11 and from 2.6.0 up to and including 2.6.2, where an insufficient check of the same-origin policy when downloading Helm charts from a configured private repository can lead to exposure of the repository credentials to a third-party provider. This issue only happens when the user configures access credentials to a private repository in Rancher inside `Apps & Marketplace > Repositories`. The issue was found and reported by Martin Andreas Ullrich. | 14 Apr 2022 | [Rancher v2.6.3](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.6.3) and [Rancher v2.5.12](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.5.12) |
|
||||
| [GHSA-hwm2-4ph6-w6m5](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/advisories/GHSA-hwm2-4ph6-w6m5) | A vulnerability was discovered in versions of Rancher starting 2.0 up to and including 2.6.3. The `restricted` pod security policy (PSP) provided in Rancher deviated from the upstream `restricted` policy provided in Kubernetes on account of which Rancher's PSP had `runAsUser` set to `runAsAny`, while upstream had `runAsUser` set to `MustRunAsNonRoot`. This allowed containers to run as any user, including a privileged user (`root`), even when Rancher's `restricted` policy was enforced on a project or at the cluster level. | 31 Mar 2022 | [Rancher v2.6.4](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.6.4) |
|
||||
| [CVE-2021-36775](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/advisories/GHSA-28g7-896h-695v) | A vulnerability was discovered in Rancher versions up to and including 2.4.17, 2.5.11 and 2.6.2. After removing a `Project Role` associated with a group from the project, the bindings that granted access to cluster-scoped resources for those subjects were not deleted. This was due to an incomplete authorization logic check. A user who was a member of the affected group with authenticated access to Rancher could exploit this vulnerability to access resources they shouldn't have had access to. The exposure level would depend on the original permission level granted to the affected project role. This vulnerability only affected customers using group based authentication in Rancher. | 31 Mar 2022 | [Rancher v2.6.3](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.6.3), [Rancher v2.5.12](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.5.12) and [Rancher v2.4.18](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.4.18) |
|
||||
| [CVE-2021-36776](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/advisories/GHSA-gvh9-xgrq-r8hw) | A vulnerability was discovered in Rancher versions starting 2.5.0 up to and including 2.5.9, that allowed an authenticated user to impersonate any user on a cluster through an API proxy, without requiring knowledge of the impersonated user's credentials. This was due to the API proxy not dropping the impersonation header before sending the request to the Kubernetes API. A malicious user with authenticated access to Rancher could use this to impersonate another user with administrator access in Rancher, thereby gaining administrator level access to the cluster. | 31 Mar 2022 | [Rancher v2.6.0](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.6.0) and [Rancher v2.5.10](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.5.10) |
|
||||
| [CVE-2021-25318](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-25318) | A vulnerability was discovered in Rancher versions 2.0 through the aforementioned fixed versions, where users were granted access to resources regardless of the resource's API group. For example, Rancher should have allowed users access to `apps.catalog.cattle.io`, but instead incorrectly gave access to `apps.*`. Resources affected in the **Downstream clusters** and **Rancher management cluster** can be found [here](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/advisories/GHSA-f9xf-jq4j-vqw4). There is not a direct mitigation besides upgrading to the patched Rancher versions. | 14 Jul 2021 | [Rancher v2.5.9](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.5.9) and [Rancher v2.4.16](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.4.16) |
|
||||
| [CVE-2021-31999](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-31999) | A vulnerability was discovered in Rancher 2.0.0 through the aforementioned patched versions, where a malicious Rancher user could craft an API request directed at the proxy for the Kubernetes API of a managed cluster to gain access to information they do not have access to. This is done by passing the "Impersonate-User" or "Impersonate-Group" header in the Connection header, which is then correctly removed by the proxy. At this point, instead of impersonating the user and their permissions, the request will act as if it was from the Rancher management server and incorrectly return the information. The vulnerability is limited to valid Rancher users with some level of permissions on the cluster. There is not a direct mitigation besides upgrading to the patched Rancher versions. | 14 Jul 2021 | [Rancher v2.5.9](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.5.9) and [Rancher v2.4.16](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.4.16) |
|
||||
| [CVE-2021-25320](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-25320) | A vulnerability was discovered in Rancher 2.2.0 through the aforementioned patched versions, where cloud credentials weren't being properly validated through the Rancher API. Specifically through a proxy designed to communicate with cloud providers. Any Rancher user that was logged-in and aware of a cloud-credential ID that was valid for a given cloud provider, could call that cloud provider's API through the proxy API, and the cloud-credential would be attached. The exploit is limited to valid Rancher users. There is not a direct mitigation outside of upgrading to the patched Rancher versions. | 14 Jul 2021 | [Rancher v2.5.9](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.5.9) and [Rancher v2.4.16](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.4.16) |
|
||||
| [CVE-2021-25313](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-25313) | A security vulnerability was discovered on all Rancher 2 versions. When accessing the Rancher API with a browser, the URL was not properly escaped, making it vulnerable to an XSS attack. Specially crafted URLs to these API endpoints could include JavaScript which would be embedded in the page and execute in a browser. There is no direct mitigation. Avoid clicking on untrusted links to your Rancher server. | 2 Mar 2021 | [Rancher v2.5.6](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.5.6), [Rancher v2.4.14](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.4.14), and [Rancher v2.3.11](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.3.11) |
|
||||
| [CVE-2019-14435](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-14435) | This vulnerability allows authenticated users to potentially extract otherwise private data out of IPs reachable from system service containers used by Rancher. This can include but not only limited to services such as cloud provider metadata services. Although Rancher allow users to configure whitelisted domains for system service access, this flaw can still be exploited by a carefully crafted HTTP request. The issue was found and reported by Matt Belisle and Alex Stevenson at Workiva. | 5 Aug 2019 | [Rancher v2.2.7](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.2.7) and [Rancher v2.1.12](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.1.12) |
|
||||
| [CVE-2019-14436](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-14436) | The vulnerability allows a member of a project that has access to edit role bindings to be able to assign themselves or others a cluster level role granting them administrator access to that cluster. The issue was found and reported by Michal Lipinski at Nokia. | 5 Aug 2019 | [Rancher v2.2.7](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.2.7) and [Rancher v2.1.12](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.1.12) |
|
||||
| [CVE-2019-13209](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-13209) | The vulnerability is known as a [Cross-Site Websocket Hijacking attack](https://www.christian-schneider.net/CrossSiteWebSocketHijacking.html). This attack allows an exploiter to gain access to clusters managed by Rancher with the roles/permissions of a victim. It requires that a victim to be logged into a Rancher server and then access a third-party site hosted by the exploiter. Once that is accomplished, the exploiter is able to execute commands against the Kubernetes API with the permissions and identity of the victim. Reported by Matt Belisle and Alex Stevenson from Workiva. | 15 Jul 2019 | [Rancher v2.2.5](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.2.5), [Rancher v2.1.11](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.1.11) and [Rancher v2.0.16](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.0.16) |
|
||||
| [CVE-2019-12303](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-12303) | Project owners can inject extra fluentd logging configurations that makes it possible to read files or execute arbitrary commands inside the fluentd container. Reported by Tyler Welton from Untamed Theory. | 5 Jun 2019 | [Rancher v2.2.4](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.2.4), [Rancher v2.1.10](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.1.10) and [Rancher v2.0.15](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.0.15) |
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| [CVE-2019-12274](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-12274) | Nodes using the built-in node drivers using a file path option allows the machine to read arbitrary files including sensitive ones from inside the Rancher server container. | 5 Jun 2019 | [Rancher v2.2.4](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.2.4), [Rancher v2.1.10](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.1.10) and [Rancher v2.0.15](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.0.15) |
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| [CVE-2019-11202](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-11202) | The default admin, that is shipped with Rancher, will be re-created upon restart of Rancher despite being explicitly deleted. | 16 Apr 2019 | [Rancher v2.2.2](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.2.2), [Rancher v2.1.9](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.1.9) and [Rancher v2.0.14](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.0.14) |
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| [CVE-2019-6287](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-6287) | Project members continue to get access to namespaces from projects that they were removed from if they were added to more than one project. | 29 Jan 2019 | [Rancher v2.1.6](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.1.6) and [Rancher v2.0.11](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.0.11) |
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| [CVE-2018-20321](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-20321) | Any project member with access to the `default` namespace can mount the `netes-default` service account in a pod and then use that pod to execute administrative privileged commands against the Kubernetes cluster. | 29 Jan 2019 | [Rancher v2.1.6](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.1.6) and [Rancher v2.0.11](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/releases/tag/v2.0.11) - Rolling back from these versions or greater have specific [instructions](../../getting-started/installation-and-upgrade/install-upgrade-on-a-kubernetes-cluster/rollbacks.md). |
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user